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INTRODUCTION: CULTURE WAR AND RELIGION 
There is unquestionably a growing cultural divide in this 
country, a polarization that resembles nothing so much as a war.  
Rather than being fought with guns and bayonets, the imple-
ments of the fight are ideas or, more precisely, political world-
views.  The battlefronts span the horizons of intellectual en-
deavor.  Disciplines such as science, ethics, education, law, and 
journalism are inescapably involved.  None of them, however, 
constitutes the most fundamental fault line of the conflict.  That 
distinction belongs to religion; and why should this fact be sur-
prising?  Paul Tillich, and Friedrich Schleiermacher before him, 
reminded us years ago that there is a symbiotic relationship be-
tween religion and culture.  Schleiermacher, addressing the “cul-
tured despisers” of religion, described it as “the profoundest 
depths whence every feeling and conception receives its form.”1  
Tillich, in a similar vein, wrote that “religion is the substance of 
culture, [while] culture is the form of religion.”2  The roots of the 
current cultural tug-of-war lie deeply embedded in the partici-
pants’ respective political assessments of religion, whether or-
thodox and fundamentalist or liberal and progressive.  Hence, 
when one speaks of such a “culture war,” one question becomes 
relevant—“Does God belong in American public life?” 
 
 1 FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, ON RELIGION: SPEECHES TO ITS CULTURED 
DESPISERS 11 (John Oman trans., Harper Torchbooks 1958) (1799). 
 2 PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 42 (Robert C. Kimball ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1972) (1959). 
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A.   Approach to the Question 
The question is a weighty one, and the answers provided by 
commentators are often characterized by subtle nuance and me-
ticulous qualification.  A social pundit may respond negatively to 
a state Supreme Court Justice who, hearing the appeal of a child 
custody case, quotes Leviticus 18:22 in condemnation of the les-
bianism of the mother.3  But the same pundit may be reserved in 
his or her criticism when a United States President concludes his 
inaugural address with the words “God bless America.”  Grada-
tions of criticism tend to be part and parcel of any expanded 
treatment of the above-stated question. 
Yet it lies beyond the scope of this article to probe these mul-
tifarious distinctions.  The goal here is a modest one.  I will first 
consider whether public life in this country was initially intended 
under the newly proposed Constitution of 1787 to be a secular af-
fair, and I will argue that the answer is far from a definitive 
“yes.”  I will then seek to explain why, in light of the indecisive 
answers that history gives us, the American public sphere is 
largely a secular place and what the U.S. Supreme Court’s role 
has been in that process, from approximately the middle of the 
twentieth century to the present. 
To fulfill this goal, in Parts I and II of this Article, I will set 
forth and analyze the thesis of Kramnick and Moore that ours is 
a “Godless Constitution”4 intended to comprise the foundation of 
a secular state.  In Parts III and IV, I will describe the tidal wave 
of secularism that overwhelmed American culture in the nine-
teenth century and critically analyze the manner in which the 
Supreme Court rode that cultural wave in its interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause during the twentieth century.  In 
Parts V and VI, I will dissect the Court’s two recent decisions re-
garding the public display of the Ten Commandments5 and then 
analyze the opinions advanced by the various Justices.  Finally, I 
will conclude with some of my thoughts concerning how the Su-
preme Court should interpret the Religion Clauses. 
I.  HIGHLIGHTS OF KRAMNICK’S AND MOORE’S ARGUMENT  
A.  The Thesis 
Kramnick and Moore argue in favor “of the godless Constitu-
 
 3 See Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., concur-
ring in part; dissenting in part). 
 4 ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A MORAL 
DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE (2005) (1996) [hereinafter GODLESS CONSTITUTION]. 
 5 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2856 (2005) and McCreary v. ACLU of Ken-
tucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727–28 (2005). 
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tion and of godless politics.”6  They insist that the Founders 
“sought to separate the operations of government from any claim7 
that human beings can know and follow divine direction in reach-
ing policy decisions.”8  The Constitution and the political state to 
which it gave birth were on an “intentionally secular base.”9  Our 
founding document, they point out, was vehemently denounced 
by many during the Framers’ own time as a godless one, pre-
cisely because it was and is such.10  Nowhere within its text is 
there a substantive reference to deity.11 
B.  Constitution Contrasted with Other American Documents 
Consider the radical difference in this respect between the 
Constitution on the one hand and the Declaration of Independ-
ence and the Articles of Confederation of 1776 on the other.  The 
Declaration mentioned “Nature’s God” and the “Creator.”  The 
Articles similarly referred to “the Great Governor of the World.”  
Yet the Constitution maintains a conspicuous silence in this re-
gard.12 
C.  Exclusion of Religious Tests 
The only reference to religion that resulted from the work of 
the Constitutional Convention was a negative one: “no religious 
 
 6 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 12. 
 7 Kramnick and Moore take aim squarely at the Christian Right.  Id. at 157–61.  It 
is an obtrusive target.  One more difficult than that is religion in general, which Kram-
nick’s and Moore’s thesis is also intended to address.  That America was never intended to 
be a Christian state is spelled out in the Treaty of Tripoli, but that all state and state-
supported activity in this country was intended to be divorced from the religious is impos-
sible to prove.  See Article II of the Treaty of Tripoli, in THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE 121–23 (Forrest Church ed., 2004) [hereinafter SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE).  See also SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF 
CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 38–49 (1963) [hereinafter LIVELY EXPERIMENT]; Robert N. Bel-
lah, Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-
TRADITIONAL WORLD 168 (University of California Press 1991) (1970) [hereinafter Civil 
Religion]. 
 8 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 12.  I do not altogether agree with the 
following statement by Erez Kalir in review of Kramnick’s and Moore’s book: “The first 
problem with [the book]—and  the genesis of several others—lies in the authors’ failure to 
define exactly what they mean by the title phrase, and especially by the term ‘godless.’” 
Erez Kalir, Book Review: Is the Constitution “Godless” or Just Nondenominational?, 106 
YALE L.J. 917, 919 (1996).  It is reasonably clear that Kramnick and Moore have embraced 
the classical liberal idea that religion, personified by “God,” has no role to play in public 
policymaking.  The authors demonstrate an indifference toward the religious that borders 
upon hostility. 
 9 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 14. 
 10 Id. at 23. 
 11 In Article VII of the document the date is written as “the Seventeenth Day of Sep-
tember in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. VII.  This reference to “our Lord” is hardly to be interpreted as a resounding 
expression of religious faith. 
 12 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 28. 
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Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.”13  Luther Martin, a dele-
gate to the Convention from Maryland, commenting upon the 
almost unanimous passage of this provision, observed the follow-
ing: 
[T]here were some members so unfashionable . . . as to think that a be-
lief in the existence of a Deity and of a state of future rewards and pun-
ishments would be some security for the good conduct of our rulers, 
and that in a Christian country it would be at least decent to hold out 
some distinction between the professors of Christianity and downright 
infidelity or paganism.14 
Oliver Ellsworth, a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention 
from Connecticut, who would later become a United States Sena-
tor and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, also was critical 
of the notion of a religious test as a qualification for public of-
fice.15  He argued that, in view of the many diverse religious de-
nominations in the United States, “[a] test in favour of any one 
denomination of christians would be to the last degree absurd.”16 
The Constitutional Convention’s antipathy to religious tests 
in the political sphere was paralleled by its refusal even to dis-
cuss Benjamin Franklin’s suggestion that each session of the 
Convention be opened with a prayer.17 
D.  Responses to the Absence of Religious Reference 
The Convention’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for religion, 
along with the secular bent of the Constitution itself, did not go 
unnoticed by the American citizenry.  Colonel William Jones, a 
delegate to Massachusetts’ ratification convention, was outspo-
ken against the document’s exclusion of religious oaths, declaring 
that “publick men were to be of those who had a good standing in 
 
 13 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 14 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 29 (quoting Luther Martin).  Martin’s 
estimate of this provision is the same as that of the Reverend Daniel Shute, who in the 
Massachusetts ratification convention spoke in favor of it, when he stated: 
  Nor is there to me any conceivable advantage, sir, that would result in the 
whole from such a test.  Unprincipled and dishonest men will not hesitate to 
subscribe to any thing, that may open the way for their advancement, and put 
them into a situation the better to execute their base and iniquitous designs.  
Honest men alone, therefore, however well qualified to serve the publick, 
would be excluded by it, and their country be deprived of the benefit of their 
abilities. 
The Reverend Daniel Shute and Colonel William Jones on Religious Tests and Christian 
Belief (Jan. 31, 1788), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, pt. 1, at 919 (Bernard Bailyn 
ed., Library of America 1993) [hereinafter THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION]. 
 15 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 42. 
 16 Oliver Ellsworth, “A Landholder” VII, CONN. COURANT (Hartford), Dec. 17, 1787, 
in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 523. 
 17 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 34. 
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the church” and “that a person could not be a good man without 
being a good Christian.”18  Henry Abbot, a North Carolinian, ech-
oed the concern of many that “[t]he exclusion of religious tests 
is . . . dangerous and impolitic,” and concluded “that if there be 
no religious test required, Pagans, Deists and Mahometans 
might obtain offices among us, and that the Senate and Repre-
sentatives might all be Pagans.”19  The Reverend David Caldwell, 
also from North Carolina, took an equally negative view of the re-
ligious oath exclusion.  For him, it amounted to little more than 
“an invitation to ‘Jews and pagans of every kind’ to govern us.”20 
William Williams, a delegate to the Connecticut ratification 
convention, was uneasy and troubled by the lack of any acknowl-
edgment in the Constitution of “the being of a God . . . [and] his 
perfections and his providence.”21  He favored editing its Pream-
ble, suggesting that its opening words be the following: 
  We the people of the United States, in a firm belief of the being 
and perfections of the one living and true God, the creator and su-
preme Governour of the world, in his universal providence and the au-
thority of his laws: that he will require of all moral agents an account 
of their conduct, that all rightful powers among men are ordained of, 
and mediately derived from God, therefore in a dependence on his 
blessing and acknowledgment of his efficient protection in establish-
ing our Independence, whereby it is become necessary to agree upon 
and settle a Constitution of federal government for ourselves . . . .22 
The suggestion failed to find a winning following. 
Kramnick and Moore observe that a similar suggestion, 
made during the height of the Civil War, also went nowhere.  In 
1863, the National Association for the Amendment of the Consti-
tution, soon renamed the National Reform Association and di-
rected by Presbyterian layman John Alexander, proposed the fol-
lowing alteration of the Preamble: 
  We, the people of the United States, humbly acknowledging Al-
mighty God as the source of all authority and power in civil govern-
ment, The Lord Jesus Christ as the Governor among the Nations, and 
His revealed will as of supreme authority, in order to constitute a 
 
 18 Id. at 32.  See also The Reverend Daniel Shute and Colonel William Jones on Reli-
gious Tests and Christian Belief, supra note 14, at 920. 
 19 Henry Abbot and James Iredell Debate the Ban on Religious Tests: Could Not the 
Pope Be President? (July 30, 1788), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, 
pt. 2, at 902. 
 20 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 32 (quoting Rev. David Caldwell and 
Samuel Spencer Continue the Debate on Religious Toleration, in THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION (July 30, 1788), supra note 14, pt. 2, at 908). 
 21 William Williams to the Printer (Feb. 11, 1788), in THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 2, at 193.  See also GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 
4, at 37.  
 22 William Williams to the Printer, supra note 21, at 193–94 (emphasis omitted). 
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Christian government . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution 
for the United States of America.23 
The proposal was brought to the attention of President Lin-
coln who, while respectful of and cordial to those who supported 
it, observed that “the work of amending the Constitution should 
not be done hastily.”24  The President, in the secular spirit of the 
Founders, simply allowed the proposal to die its own natural 
death. 
This evidence, according to our authors, demonstrates that 
the lack of substantive religious reference in the Constitution, as 
the document emerged from the Philadelphia Convention, was 
hardly a happenstance, but was intended by its Framers, and 
later accepted by the states and thoughtful leaders like Lincoln 
who came along in American history, to convey a strong message 
in favor of the separation of church and state.25 
E.  Roger Williams: Religion and Secular Politics 
The doctrine of church-state separation was, Kramnick and 
Moore maintain, solidly embedded in liberal and religious 
thought, both in America and in England.  The roots of the doc-
trine in this country go back to the religious leader Roger Wil-
liams, who pioneered it in his book, The Bloudy Tenant of Perse-
cution.26  Religious purity and good government were, for him, 
two separate and distinct concerns.27  There was, he taught, no 
necessary correlation between being a good and steadfast gov-
ernmental official on the one hand and a religious believer on the 
other.28  Nor would there ever be justifiable cause for the gov-
ernment to support religion, either directly or indirectly, since 
the Kingdom of God was and is not of this world.29  Williams sub-
scribed to the proposition that religion is fundamentally a private 
concern of conscience.30  Although he never went so far as to 
maintain that religious belief is irrelevant to public policy,31 be-
lieving as he did that elected officials were not immune from reli-
gious influence32 and that the state should, in keeping with the 
Ten Commandments, enjoin murder, thievery, and adultery,33 
 
 23 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 146. 
 24 Id. at 146–47. 
 25 Id. at 12, 66. 
 26 Id. at 48; ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENANT OF PERSECUTION FOR CAUSE OF 
CONSCIENCE (Richard Groves ed., Mercer Univ. Press 2001) (1644). 
 27 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 52. 
 28 See id. at 53–54. 
 29 See id. at 52. 
 30 Id. at 59–60. 
 31 Id. at 53. 
 32 Id. at 61. 
 33 Id. at 60. 
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Williams was strongly insistent that religious morality should be 
distinguished from national pieties and that governmental offi-
cials should never claim to act in God’s name or under his au-
thority.34 
F.  The Lockean State and Religious Freedom  
Religious freedom, understood through the frame of church-
state separation, had been advocated not only by the influentially 
religious in America, but had also been promoted and defended 
by the most thoughtfully liberal in England, with John Locke be-
ing the foremost example.  Kramnick and Moore stress that 
American personages such as John Adams, John Otis, Samuel 
Adams, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and 
Benjamin Franklin were supremely indebted to Locke’s intellec-
tual treasury.35  He believed in a minimal government, the func-
tion of which was to preserve life, liberty, and especially property 
and, aside from that, was to stay out of people’s lives.36  One’s 
right to secure property is accorded by God and natural law,37 
and government treads upon this right at the expense of violat-
ing nature and becoming tyrannous.38  Locke’s conception of gov-
ernment is therefore, according to our authors, “purely nega-
tive.”39  It does little more than to establish the ground rules by 
which to compete for wealth and property.40  By no means should 
the political state attempt to defend or to promote moral and re-
ligious truths or any particular notion of good.41 
Locke’s minimalist, or laissez faire, view of government al-
lows him to draw a bold line of demarcation between political and 
religious issues.  The government must take care not to encroach 
upon the latter, which is solely a matter of private provenance.42  
Religious beliefs do not concern the state; they neither prejudice 
 
 34 Id. at 61. 
 35 Id. at 72. 
 36 Id. at 73.  See also JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 178 (Mark Goldie ed., Everyman 1993) (1689), in which the 
author maintains that a person is willing to leave the state of nature and to unite with 
others “for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the 
general name, property.”  Locke stresses that the protection of one’s property is the pri-
mary rationale for government.  Id. 
 37 LOCKE, supra note 36, at 130–31. 
 38 See id. at 217.  Locke quotes King James I as saying, “whereas the proud and am-
bitious tyrant doth think, his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his 
desires . . . the righteous and just king doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be 
ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people.”  Id. 
 39 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 73. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 73–74. 
 42 Id. at 75.  See also JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 28–29 (Pren-
tice Hall 1950) (1689) [hereinafter TOLERATION], in which he argues that religion is a pri-
vate, personal matter. 
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another’s property rights nor injure him or her in any way.43  
These structural limitations serve to carve out an ample area for 
the free, unmolested exercise of religion and for the mutual tol-
eration of sectarian differences.44  For Locke, civil government is 
concerned with outward force, while “[a]ll the life and power of 
true religion consist in the inward and full persuasion of the 
mind.”45  The punitive power of the state can never be of assis-
tance in the salvation of souls,46 for the church is “a thing abso-
lutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.”47 
Locke’s vision of religious freedom, conceptualized as a pri-
vate sphere of ritual and belief, to be distinguished and sepa-
rated from the public domain of the state, deeply imbued itself 
upon the minds of the Framers and was reflected in the secular 
character of the Constitution that they proposed.48 
G.  Thomas Jefferson and the “Wall Of Separation” 
1.  Jefferson and Locke 
Thomas Jefferson regarded Locke as one of “the three great-
est men that have ever lived, without any exception.”49  Jefferson 
was familiar with the latter’s Second Treatise of Government, and 
on at least one occasion commended it to a friend as one of a 
group of excellent and influential works concerning politics.50 
Locke’s minimalist state appealed to Jefferson.51  Both men 
 
 43 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 78. 
 44 See TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 17, in which Locke explains that “[c]ivil inter-
ests” consist of “life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward 
things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like,” and that the jurisdiction of 
the state “reaches only to these civil concernments . . . and that it neither can nor ought in 
any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls.” 
 45 Id. at 18. 
 46 Id. at 19. 
 47 Id. at 27. 
 48 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 77–78. 
 49 See FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN 
AMERICA 161 (2003) [hereinafter THE FOUNDING FATHERS] (pointing out that Jefferson 
commissioned John Trumbull as artist to paint portraits of Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, 
and John Locke on the same canvas in order that these personages might be given a place 
of honor at Monticello and “not be confounded at all with the herd of other great men”) 
(quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, To John Trumbull, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 
434, 435 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin Books 1977) (1975)).  Compare NOBLE E. 
CUNNINGHAM, JR., IN PURSUIT OF REASON: THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 129 (Bal-
lantine Books 1988) (1987), where the author relates that Jefferson “asked Trumbull to 
purchase for him in England [portraits] of Bacon, Locke, and Newton.” 
 50 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 82.  Jefferson describes the work as 
“Locke’s little book on government.” Id. 
 51 Id. at 70.  When describing Jefferson’s view of the state, Kramnick and Moore 
write: “That government was best which governed least, as Jefferson put it.”  Id.  It 
should be noted that there is no evidence that the third President ever wrote or uttered 
such words.  While they are often attributed to him in error, they accurately portray his 
understanding. 
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favored and supported a policy of laissez faire not only in politics, 
but also in religion.  Kramnick and Moore observe that “[t]he 
Declaration of Independence reads like a paraphrase”52 of the 
Second Treatise.  They also point out that, in his Notes on the 
State of Virginia, Jefferson wrote of religion that “it does me no 
injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god.  It 
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”53  The passage 
brings to mind the words of Locke, who argued that religious 
matters should not be regulated by the state, “because they are 
not prejudicial to other men’s rights, nor do they break the public 
peace of societies.”54  Both thinkers, state Kramnick and Moore, 
were committed to the idea that religion has no place in the pub-
lic and political sector, but belongs exclusively to the realm of 
personal and private opinion.55 
2.  A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom 
Jefferson’s understanding of the relationship between church 
and state was enacted into Virginia law in 1786.  Styled “A Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom,” it stated in part  
that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious 
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, re-
strained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall other-
wise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all 
men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opin-
ions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise dimin-
ish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.56 
The bill was shepherded through the Virginia Assembly by 
none other than master strategist James Madison and, in the es-
timation of Kramnick and Moore, constituted a “comprehensive 
call for a total separation of church and state.”57  The clergy, as 
might be expected, condemned the measure as indicative of a dis-
regard for public worship and an indifference to religion.58 
3.  Jefferson and the Clergy 
Our authors further note that Jefferson had little use for the 
clergy.  Many of them reciprocated the animus and thought that 
 
 52 Id. at 72. 
 53 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, QUERY XVII (1787), re-
printed in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 283, 285 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) [herein-
after WRITINGS]. 
 54 TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 42; see GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 
87. 
 55 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 96. 
 56 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1789), reprinted in 
WRITINGS, supra note 53, at 346, 347. 
 57 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 92. 
 58 Id. at 91–92. 
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his election to the Presidency would jeopardize their place in 
American life.  Jefferson privately responded to their dislike of 
him in a missive to his friend Benjamin Rush: 
They . . . believe that any portion of power confided to me, will be ex-
erted in opposition to their schemes.  And they believe rightly: for I 
have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form 
of tyranny over the mind of man.  But this is all they have to fear from 
me: and enough too in their opinion.59 
Interestingly enough, an excerpt from this passage appears 
in the Jefferson Memorial.  Many churchgoing Americans, ob-
serve Kramnick and Moore, scarcely realize that the very words 
memorializing Jefferson are those which comprise an attack 
upon the Philadelphia clergy.60 
Yet not all clergy were averse to Jefferson.  Some, like Bap-
tist ministers Isaac Backus and John Leland, supported him in 
his bid to become President.  These and other evangelicals re-
sented the fact that state governments were attempting to define 
religious doctrines and to impose them upon everyone by force of 
law.61  Baptists were impressed by the fact that Jefferson had 
written and inspired the passage of the statute establishing reli-
gious freedom in Virginia and stood firmly for the liberty for 
which they had been struggling.62 
4.  Jefferson’s Correspondence with the Danbury Baptist 
Association 
After Jefferson was elected President, Baptists from the 
Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut wrote a letter to him 
setting forth, in part, their concern that their religious privileges 
in that state were enjoyed merely as “favors granted” and not as 
“inalienable rights.”63  In his letter of reply, Jefferson under-
scored a belief they and he shared in common, i.e., “that religion 
 
 59 Id. at 69 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 
1800), reprinted in WRITINGS, supra note 53, at 1080, 1082, available at 
http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/jeff1080.htm). 
 60 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 69. 
 61 Id. at 110–21.  There were churches that separated from the Congregational es-
tablishment in New England.  Some of these churches became Baptist.  Id. at 116.  Not 
being part of the protected religious establishment, they were still required either to pay 
financial support to the established church or to obtain a formal certificate declaring that 
they were exempt from it.  Id. at 114–15.  Backus and Leland strongly opposed the idea of 
a Christian commonwealth that employed sanctions of law in this manner.  Although they 
were not disciples of Locke and were not known for being political theorists, they recog-
nized that their view of religious freedom shared an affinity with  Jefferson’s liberal phi-
losophy.  Id. at 110–11, 116–17, 119–20. 
 62 Id. at 119. 
 63 Correspondence with the Danbury Baptist Association, 1801–1802, in DANIEL L. 
DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND 
STATE app. 6, at 142, 143 (2002). 
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is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he 
owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, [and] that 
the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not 
opinions.”64  The President then stated the following: “I contem-
plate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American 
people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between 
Church & State.”65  According to Kramnick and Moore, Baptists 
“gave qualified support to Jefferson’s wall of separation between 
church and state,” and they “agreed with [him] that America had 
not been founded as a Christian nation.”66 
5.  Jefferson’s Respect for Separationism   
Jefferson showed respect for the “wall of separation” when he 
abandoned the practice of his predecessors in proclaiming na-
tional days of prayer, fasting, and thanksgiving.67  He couched 
his inaction in terms of the state’s not infringing upon religion 
rather than in terms of the churches attempting to preempt the 
powers of state.68 
H.  Undermining the Secular Ideal 
1.  Religious Holidays and the Appointment of Chaplains 
Kramnick and Moore point out that there have been re-
markable deviations from the secular ideal of government ad-
vanced in the Constitution.  Two of them involved none other 
than James Madison, whose views on church and state are 
thought to have closely approximated those of his political men-
tor Thomas Jefferson.69  One deviation occurred while Madison 
was President.  During the War of 1812, Congress requested that 
there be a day “of public humiliation and prayer.”70  Under in-
 
 64 Id. at 148 (citation omitted). 
 65 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).  Kramnick and Moore argue 
that Jefferson’s celebrated metaphor was inspired by James Burgh’s book Crito, published 
in 1767, in which Burgh argued that it was necessary to “build an impenetrable wall of 
separation between things sacred and civil.” See GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 
83 (quoting JAMES BURGH, 2 CRITO, OR ESSAYS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 119 (London, 1767)). 
 66 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 119.  The authors do, however, point out 
that Isaac Backus took issue with Jefferson on numerous points.  For example, Backus 
did not seem to oppose the assertion that the United States was a Christian nation, and 
he supported a religious test for officeholders that discriminated against Roman Catho-
lics.  Id. at 119–20. 
 67 Id. at 96. 
 68 Id. at 96–97. 
 69 SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 7, at 132. 
 70 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 105 (quoting James Madison, A Procla-
mation (July 9, 1812), in 24 ANNALS OF CONG. 2223, available at 
http://www.wallbuilders.com/resources/search/detail.php?ResourceID=39). 
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tense pressure from both politicians and clerics alike, the Presi-
dent acceded to the request, in contravention of his apparently 
firmly held view that religious matters constituted no part of 
government polity.  Another deviation occurred in 1787, when 
Madison was a Congressman and voted to support the appoint-
ment of chaplains to Congress, which appointment Kramnick and 
Moore state that he unsuccessfully opposed.71 
2.  The Coinage   
The authors also observe that the Constitution was under-
mined when God entered the United States currency in 1863.  
During the height of the Civil War, Horace Bushnell, the famous 
Connecticut preacher, decried the influence of Thomas Jefferson’s 
view that government should be a godless endeavor and inter-
preted the bloody carnage of the War as divine retribution for the 
country’s acceptance of that view.  Secretary of the Treasury, 
Salmon P. Chase, in response to such religious sentiment, de-
cided to recommend a religious motto for one-cent and two-cent 
coinage.  The motto finally approved by Chase and the Congress 
was “IN GOD WE TRUST.”72  Thereafter, it became common-
place on United States currency. 
3.  Sunday Movement and Delivery of the Mail   
The authors also describe the bitter conflict between the 
church and the state, from 1810 to 1912, over the Sunday move-
ment and delivery of the mail.73  In 1810, Congress enacted legis-
lation which provided that the mail would move every day and 
that post offices would be open for at least an hour each day.  By 
1815, clergymen and their churches were actively urging the re-
peal of the legislation, although their attack upon it was ulti-
mately unsuccessful.74 
 
 71 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 105.  But compare Marsh v. Chambers, 
463 U.S. 783, 788, 788 n.8 (1983), in which Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the major-
ity, points out that the House of Representatives elected its first chaplain on May 1, 1789, 
and that Madison voted for the bill authorizing payment of the chaplains for both the 
House and the Senate.  Id. at 788, n.8. 
 72 See United States Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet on the History of “In 
God We Trust,” http://www.ustreas.gov/education/fact-sheets/currency/in-god-we-
trust.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).  According to this source, Secretary Chase was 
moved to the decision by a letter to him from Rev. M.R. Watkinson, from Ridleyville, 
Pennsylvania.  A portion of the letter is as follows: “One fact touching our currency has 
hitherto been seriously overlooked.  I mean the recognition of the Almighty God in some 
form on our coins.” The clergyman asked, “What if our Republic were not shattered be-
yond reconstruction?  Would not the antiquaries of succeeding centuries rightly reason 
from our past that we were a heathen nation?”  Rev. Watkinson’s suggestion was a coin 
with the name of God inscribed upon it.  Id. 
 73 See GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at ch. 7. 
 74 Id. at 133–34. 
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But in 1828, a second frontal assault was directed by Chris-
tians, principally by clergyman Lyman Beecher and evangelical 
businessman Josiah Bissell, Jr.  They urged a strategy of boycott 
against all companies that operated on Sunday and sent over 900 
petitions to Congress demanding repeal of the 1810 legislation.75 
With the advent of the railroad and the telegraph, the com-
mercial atmosphere in America changed significantly, with the 
result that seven-day mail service lost its compelling economic 
rationale.  Kramnick and Moore point out that by the 1850s most 
of the Sunday movement of mail was slowed, if not eliminated, 
and that, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the trend grew.76  By 
1912, Congress had closed all post offices that remained open on 
Sunday.77 
4.  “Under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance 
Our authors argue that the entry of God into the Pledge of 
Allegiance undermined the “godless federal constitutional struc-
ture,” which the Framers erected.78  America was in the midst of 
the Cold War and was threatened by communism, primarily of 
the Soviet variety.  The Knights of Columbus, the Reverend Billy 
Graham, President Eisenhower, and the United States Congress 
all believed that the country’s ultimate protection from the threat 
was to be found “under God.”79  So in 1954, a half century after 
Francis Bellamy’s Pledge had been adopted, the phrase “under 
God” was incorporated into it.80 
Contemplating the next time the Supreme Court will ad-
dress Michael Newdow’s claim that this phrase in the Pledge vio-
lates the Establishment Clause, Kramnick and Moore are admit-
tedly troubled by the prospect that the Court may decide “that 
being religious, i.e., recognizing the existence of a deity”81 is what 
it means to be a patriot.  They write, “[t]his should be deeply 
 
 75 Id. at 135–36. 
 76 Id. at 142. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 143. 
 79 Id. at 196.  See also SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
SECULARISM 308 (2004).  Jacoby underscores the role played by the Knights of Columbus 
and the Roman Catholic Church in the adoption of the “under God” language, although 
she makes clear that not only Catholics, but also Protestants and Jews were involved in 
the venture.  She further explains the Roman Catholic hierarchy’s leadership of the 
movement to incorporate the phrase into the Pledge “represented a major tactical change” 
on their part with regard to public education.  Instead of attempting to banish all vestiges 
of Protestantism from the schools, the Roman Catholic leaders would support religious 
ideas in public schools that did not violate their own doctrine.  Id. at 308–09. 
 80 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 196. 
 81 Id. at 197.  See also L. Scott Smith, From Typology to Synthesis: Re-Casting the 
Jurisprudence of Religion, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 51, 80–95 (2005) [hereinafter From Typology 
to Synthesis] (analyzing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004)). 
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worrisome to all of us, whether one be personally religious or not.  
The question of whether God exists or not is not a question that 
should be before our legislative bodies and our courts, whatever a 
majority might say.”82 
Although Kramnick and Moore emphasize that the Constitu-
tion created a secular state, they highlight that this secularism 
“is a precious but confused legacy, one that Americans have 
fought over since the beginning of the republic.”83  In spite of 
prominent deviations from the constitutional ideal, the hope is 
that “the state and religion will not conflict and that each will 
work in complementary ways to lead us toward the creation of a 
just society.”84  The formula by which the hope will be realized, 
according to the authors, is that of the separation of church and 
state, a standard that they freely acknowledge is in trouble.85 
II. ANALYSIS 
A.  An Argument from Silence 
The fact that the Constitution contains no positive reference 
to religion and no reference to God whatsoever is not proof that 
the document was intended to create a secular state.  For Kram-
nick and Moore to rest their thesis, even in part, upon this foun-
dation amounts to an argument from silence.  It is like stating 
that, because no American President has invoked the name of 
Christ in an inaugural address, it follows that none has professed 
Christianity.  One must remember that, when the Constitution 
initially emerged from the Philadelphia Convention and was pre-
sented to the states for ratification, there was no mention of the 
freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly, the right to bear 
arms, or the right against cruel and unusual punishment, to 
name but a few of the Framers’ most notable silences.  If one had 
lived in that day and had drawn the conclusion from such silence 
that the Framers were not favorably disposed to such rights and 
freedoms, he or she certainly would have been mistaken. 
1.  The Issue of States’ Rights 
There are multiple inferences which one may draw concern-
ing why the Constitution contains no reference to deity.  Kram-
nick’s and Moore’s thesis that the Founders desired to create a 
secular state and a “godless politic” comprises only one such in-
ference, and perhaps the least convincing one at that.  It would 
 
 82 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 197.   
 83 Id. at 200. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
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certainly be as easy to reason that, under the federalist system of 
government that the Founders were proposing, they considered 
religion a matter best reserved to the states and one over which 
the national government should have no jurisdiction.  We are 
aware, after all, that many of those who were involved in the 
proposal and adoption of the Constitution were profoundly inter-
ested in and sensitive to the issue of states’ rights.  James Madi-
son continually addressed the fears of those who believed that 
the national government would swallow up state governments.  
He wrote that “all those alarms which have been sounded, of a 
meditated or consequential annihilation of the State Govern-
ments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to 
the chimerical fears of the authors of them.”86  He highlighted, in 
the same vein, that “each of the principal branches of the federal 
Government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the 
State Governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, 
which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious, 
than too overbearing towards them.”87   
Madison’s tone was categorical and his point unmistakable 
as he tirelessly underscored that the jurisdiction of the proposed 
federal government “extends to certain enumerated objects only, 
and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sover-
eignty over all other objects.”88  Not only Madison, but also many 
men of the time, like George Mason,89 James Wilson,90 and Sam-
uel Bryan,91 spoke in the most serious and solemn tones about 
the issue of states’ rights.  So why is it not plausible to conclude, 
 
 86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 14, pt. 2, at 116. 
 87 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 14, pt. 2, at 104. 
 88 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 14, pt. 2, at 31. 
 89 See George Mason Fears for the Rights of the People, in THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 2, at 605.  Mason states that the power of the “General 
Government” to tax the states directly is “totally subversive of every principle which has 
hitherto governed us” and “is calculated to annihilate totally the State Governments.”  Id. 
 90 See James Wilson’s Speech at a Public Meeting, in THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 67.  Wilson assures his listeners that “it is evi-
dently absurd to suppose . . . that the annihilation of the State governments will result 
from their union.”  Id.  Later, in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, he described 
the driving principle of federalism as follows: “whatever object was confined in its nature 
and operation to a particular State, ought to be subject to the separate government of the 
States, but whatever in its nature and operation extended beyond a particular State, 
ought to be comprehended within the F[e]deral jurisdiction.”  James Wilson’s Opening 
Address, in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 796. 
 91 See Reply to Wilson’s Speech: “Centinel” [Samuel Bryan] II, in THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 80.  Bryan responds to Wilson’s initial speech and 
asserts that he “has recourse to the most flimsey sophistry in his attempt to refute the 
charge that the new plan of general government will supersede and render powerless the 
state governments.”  Id. 
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in contradistinction to the argument of Kramnick and Moore, 
that the Founders may have regarded issues of religion as ones 
which the states, and not the national government, should de-
cide?  In such light, would it not make sense that the nation’s pa-
triarchs apparently felt no compulsion to cover ground that the 
state constitutions had already covered?92  Kramnick and Moore 
are curiously silent regarding the towering issue of federalism 
that occupies, even on occasion monopolizes, the first debates re-
garding the Constitution. 
2.  A Reluctance to State the Obvious 
Our authors further ignore a second likely and closely re-
lated inference.  The Framers’ failure to reference God in the 
Constitution may have amounted to little more than an expres-
sion of their desire not to address unnecessary issues.  Consider 
the manner in which Noah Webster engaged the argument, made 
by those who opposed the Constitution, that there was no provi-
sion within it against a standing army during times of peace.  His 
words serve to enlighten us about why there is silence on particu-
lar subjects.  He asks: “Why do not people object that no provi-
sion is made against the introduction of a body of Turkish Jani-
zaries; or against making the Alcoran the rule of faith and 
practice, instead of the Bible?”93  “The answer to such objections,” 
he emphasizes, “is simply this—no such provision is necessary.”94  
Webster explains that there is no provision against standing ar-
mies because “the principles and habits, as well as the power” of 
the American people are opposed to them, and that “there is as 
little necessity to guard against them by positive constitutions, as 
to prohibit the establishment of the Mahometan religion.”95  
Would taking Webster’s point seriously in this instance not read-
ily suggest that the Founders’ failure to refer to God in the Con-
stitution could have had to do with their reluctance to state the 
obvious?  This is certainly an inference no less viable than sup-
posing that they intended to secularize American public life.  One 
may wonder that, if the latter had been their object, why they 
 
 92 The Massachusetts Constitution required the governor and legislators to believe 
the “Christian religion.”  The Maryland Constitution similarly required officeholders to 
declare their “belief in the Christian religion.”  The New Hampshire Constitution limited 
senators to those of “the protestant religion.”  Delaware’s oath of office required affirma-
tion of the Trinity and the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testaments.  North 
Carolina required its officeholders to affirm the being of God, to profess the truth of Prot-
estantism, to accept the divine authority of the Old and New Testaments, and not to hold 
to any religious principle “incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State . . . .”  See 
THE FOUNDING FATHERS, supra note 49, at 250–51. 
 93 See Noah Webster, A Citizen of America, in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 14, pt. 1, at 150. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 151. 
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proposed a Constitution that left the states free to do about relig-
ion what they wished. 
3.  No Justification for Ineffectual Provisions 
Another reasonable inference not in keeping with the secu-
larization thesis deserves mention.  Jefferson once wrote that in 
matters of religion, the effect of coercion was “[t]o make one half 
the world fools, and the other half hypocrites.”96  The point was 
not lost on the Founders nor on those who debated the adoption 
of the Constitution.  Oliver Ellsworth observed that it is easy for 
“an unprincipled man”97 to take an oath or to declare his belief in 
a creed and then to justify himself for not comporting himself in 
accordance with it.  Requirements such as religious oaths and 
tests tend to bind only the person whose virtue binds him any-
way; they in no way safeguard the body politic from and screen 
out the disreputable opportunist who lies and takes the oath or 
test insincerely.  “In short,” Ellsworth maintained, “test-laws are 
utterly ineffectual.”98  James Iredell made the same point when 
he opined in North Carolina’s ratification convention that reli-
gious oaths do not fulfill their purpose.99  Why incorporate a well-
meaning, albeit ineffectual, requirement into the Constitution?  
It comprises nothing short of a quantum leap in logic to conclude 
the failure to do so ipso facto suggests that the Founders’ goal 
was to secularize American public life. 
4.  The Overarching Point 
While the Constitution contains no substantive reference to 
God and no positive reference to religion, it is prudent to exercise 
caution when interpreting these facts.  They do not in and of 
themselves demonstrate an antipathy to public expressions of re-
ligion, nor do they reveal skepticism regarding the idea of God.  
One need not conclude that they illustrate the Founders’ desire 
to create an entirely secular state.  Such facts allow a variety of 
inferences, some of which are incompatible with Kramnick’s and 
Moore’s thesis, such as those set forth above. 
B.  Roger Williams and John Locke 
1.  Roger Williams’s View of Separation 
If the separation of church and state is interpreted to mean 
that the latter is to be a thoroughly secular sphere, then the ap-
 
 96 JEFFERSON, supra note 53, at 283, 286. 
 97 Ellsworth, supra note 16, at 523. 
 98 Id. at 524. 
 99 Henry Abbot and James Iredell Debate the Ban on Religious Tests, supra note 19, 
at 904. 
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peal to Roger Williams is in vain.  According to one scholar, Wil-
liams “had no argument with making God’s will supreme in pub-
lic as well as in private life.”100  His dispute was with the manner 
in which the Puritans in Massachusetts were attempting to do it.  
He emphasized that civil magistrates should not seek to inter-
pose their will upon church affairs by forcing another under 
threat of legal penalty to obey commands, which come as a “di-
rect call from God.”101  But he was also insistent that God should 
not be left out of the affairs of state.  He asserted that civil peace 
arises and is maintained from not only civil laws, but also “true 
religion.”102  He declared: “Civil peace cannot stand entire where 
religion is corrupted.”103 
Since Williams’s emphasis upon separation was not his way 
of shielding the state from the influence of the church and of re-
ligion, how may his notion of separation be characterized?  It 
was, for him, the means of protecting the individual’s right of 
conscience, while simultaneously safeguarding the purity of the 
church and of “true religion.”  He was haunted by the specter of a 
pure and righteous Christian believer, who desired nothing more 
than to reside within a “garden” fashioned by God that is sepa-
rated and walled off from the “wilderness” of the world, being mo-
lested by civil authorities and forced at the point of sword to con-
fess false beliefs.104  There are admittedly points of overlap 
between Williams’s view of separation as a quest for religious pu-
rity and Kramnick’s and Moore’s view of it as advocacy for a god-
less state and politics, but the two visions differ radically from 
each other in their underlying assumptions, motivation, and ul-
timate objective.  To conflate them is to misunderstand both. 
2.  John Locke’s View of Separation 
Locke, as revealed in his Letter of Toleration, did not speak 
of church and state so much in terms of being separate spheres 
as of being different ones.105  Aside from this fact, his view of 
 
 100 JERALD C. BRAUER, PROTESTANTISM IN AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 33 (1965), 
available at http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=1663&C=1656. 
 101 Id. 
 102 WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 153. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 38–51 (2002) [here-
inafter SEPARATION], in which Hamburger argues that Williams adopted “the wall of 
separation” metaphor as an image of purity which he sought in religion. 
 105 See TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 27, where the author states that church is “a 
thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.”  Compare and contrast 
this statement with the way in which Locke distinguishes the two elsewhere in this work: 
e.g., civil government is concerned with the outward, while religion the inward, id. at 18; 
civil government is restricted to the things of the temporal world, while religion with 
those in the world to come, id. at 20; civil government is a public matter, whereas religion 
is a private, personal one, id. at 28–31; civil government enforces its precepts with penal-
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separation is a narrow one.  It rests upon his minimalist concep-
tion that the raison d’etre of the state is the protection of life, lib-
erty, and property.  Because the public realm of government is 
limited, the private and personal realm of religion is expansive.  
As the tentacles of government now reach deeper into people’s 
lives than they did under Locke’s theory, his view of separation is 
increasingly inapplicable, if not impossible.  The advent of the 
welfare state, in other words, has rendered his notion of separa-
tion archaic and hard to square with the present. 
So for commentators like Kramnick and Moore to call upon 
the classical liberalism of Locke in order to defend their regime of 
secularizing the current welfare state is confused and disingenu-
ous from the start.  The essential condition for Locke’s view of the 
separation of church and state is a minimalist state.  Without 
that, the jurisdiction of the state eventually consumes that of the 
church, rendering it powerless.  Assuming that the state is a god-
less sphere, then godlessness will predominate throughout soci-
ety as the state increases.  Locke’s political philosophy does not 
support such an outcome.  He was not by any stretch of the 
imagination the secularist that Kramnick and Moore are and can 
hardly be relied upon to support their argument. 
Our authors should not regard Locke’s view of separation as 
helpful to their defense of the secular state for other notable rea-
sons.  The leading rationale for a secular state is toleration, but 
Locke’s view of separation does not lend itself to the whole-
hearted promotion of that virtue.  In Locke’s view, all religious 
beliefs are not equally deserving of protection.  Beliefs that are 
subversive to the state should never be protected.106  Nor should 
those religious beliefs that undermine the foundations of human 
society.107  What is more, a church in which communicants owe 
their allegiance to another prince, (and here some think that he 
was referring specifically to Roman Catholics although he ex-
plains that the reference is to Islam),108 cannot be tolerated.109  
Atheists likewise have no place in Locke’s state.110  The point is 
that his view of the separation of church and state is quite nar-
row and is as influenced by religion as it is separated from it.  To 
phrase the observation another way, Locke’s is a political point of 
view that provides freedom of religion, but no freedom from it.  
 
ties, but religion relies only upon the light of reason and evidence, id. at 19; and civil gov-
ernment is concerned with life, liberty, and property, whereas religion is concerned with 
the salvation of souls, id. at 17. 
 106 Id. at 50. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Patrick Romanell, Introduction to TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 10. 
 109 TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 51. 
 110 Id. at 52. 
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To correlate this position with Kramnick’s and Moore’s is possible 
perhaps, but only if one takes a broad leap of abstraction and 
turns a blind eye to what Locke specifically taught. 
3.  Summary Observation 
Here again, it is imprudent to invoke, as Kramnick and 
Moore have done, the views of Roger Williams and John Locke in 
order to defend the secular state.  While there are, between these 
icons and our authors, certain similarities and points of agree-
ment, they are far from conclusive and ultimately convince only 
those who are already convinced of the secularist position. 
C.  Thomas Jefferson and the Secular State 
1.  The Celebrated “Wall” 
The most egregious mistake that Kramnick and Moore make 
is that they, in a less than critical fashion, enlist Jefferson in 
support of their thesis and interpret his correspondence with the 
Danbury Baptists as an illustration of his dedication to the no-
tion of the secular state. 
One must first remember that the third President was in-
deed a devoted disciple of Locke.  He believed that the best gov-
ernment was a minimal one.111  The national government was, 
for him, properly limited; there were undertakings that were 
permitted to it, but many others that were not.  It was, with re-
spect to religion, distinguishable from state governments and ec-
clesiastical institutions.112  States were free to engage in religious 
activities, and Jefferson had no problem with that idea.113  He 
had even issued a thanksgiving proclamation while he was gov-
ernor of Virginia.114  Furthermore, as a member of the Virginia 
House of Burgesses, he had participated in the drafting and en-
actment of a resolution calling for a day of fasting, humiliation, 
and prayer.115  Daniel L. Driesbach perceptively concludes, there-
fore, that “[t]he ‘wall’ metaphor was not offered as a general pro-
nouncement on the prudential relationship between religion and 
all civil government; rather, it was, more specifically, a state-
ment delineating the legitimate constitutional jurisdictions of the 
federal and state governments on matters pertaining to relig-
 
 111 See GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 70. 
 112 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1805) para. 7, reprinted 
in WRITINGS, supra note 53, at 518, 519–20 [hereinafter Second Inaugural]. 
 113 See id. 
 114 DANIEL L. DRIESBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 58–59 (2002) [hereinafter JEFFERSON AND THE WALL]. 
 115 Id. at 56. 
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ion.”116  The letter to the Danbury Baptists, in short, served a po-
litical purpose: it was a way by which the President could swipe 
at John Adams and other Federalists who, during the malicious 
1800 presidential campaign, had been suspected of supporting 
the establishment of a national church.117 
2.  Jefferson and Public Religion 
Kramnick’s and Moore’s depiction of Jefferson’s views border 
upon caricature.  His statements and actions were far more com-
plex than these authors portray.  Aside from his conviction that 
states were free to engage in religious observances, Jefferson 
nonetheless could bend his own philosophy a bit in the national 
arena.  When the Reverend John Leland, who had been instru-
mental in disestablishing the Anglican Church in Virginia, came 
to Washington approximately a year after Jefferson initially took 
office as President, Leland not only presented the President with 
a mammoth cheese weighing twelve hundred and thirty-five 
pounds,118 but  also preached in the Hall of the House of Repre-
sentatives the following Sunday.119  Jefferson, a mere two days 
after writing his letter to the Danbury Baptists in which he ad-
vanced his famous metaphor, appeared in the House to hear 
Leland preach.  Jefferson’s listening to Leland’s sermon in this 
context did not represent a sudden break from his usual practice, 
since he had attended worship services on public property before 
becoming President.120  He would likewise attend public religious 
services throughout his Presidency.121  In a similar vein, during 
his Second Inaugural Address, Jefferson confessed his need for 
“the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our fore-
fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land, and planted them 
in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of 
life,”122 and he invited his countrymen “to join with me in suppli-
cations, that he will so enlighten the minds of your servants, 
guide their councils, and prosper their measures, that whatso-
ever they do, shall result in your good, and shall secure to you 
the peace, friendship, and approbation of all nations.”123  These 
are all indications that Kramnick and Moore may have painted 
an oversimplified picture. 
 
 116 Id. at 60. 
 117 Id. at 57. 
 118 Id. at 10. 
 119 Id. at 21. 
 120 Id. at 23. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Second Inaugural, supra note 112, at para. 15. 
 123 Id. 
299-358 SMITH.DOC 5/30/2007 9:58:56 PM 
2006] Does God Belong in American Public Life? 321 
3.  Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom 
There is no question that this statute, which was inspired by 
Jefferson, disestablished religion in the state of Virginia.  It rep-
resented a milestone of libertarian accomplishment.  No longer 
would religion be enforced by coercive means.  No one would 
thereafter be compelled to support religious worship or, for that 
matter, any instrumentality of religion.  Yet it cannot go unno-
ticed that the first protracted sentence of the bill reads, in some 
respects, like a confession of faith.  The sentence refers to “Al-
mighty God,” to “his supreme will,” and to “the plan of the holy 
author of our religion, who being lord both of body and mind.”124  
The question that immediately comes to mind is whether the Bill 
demonstrates a conviction regarding disestablishment or one re-
garding separation.  If the latter, then why the weighty religious 
references?  Would Kramnick and Moore argue that these refer-
ences are secular?  Does the statute really, as they claim, amount 
to a “comprehensive call for a total separation of church and 
state,”125 or is this characterization simply another indication of 
their inclination to exaggerate and to accentuate only a part of 
the evidence? 
4.  Separation versus Disestablishment 
Indeed, when one examines the writings of leading eight-
eenth century Americans, men like Patrick Henry, Samuel Ad-
ams, Isaac Backus, George Mason, John Adams, Caleb Wallace, 
John Leland, Oliver Ellsworth, and George Washington, who are 
frequently thought to have subscribed to the secular theory of 
“separation of church and state,” only the most meager evidence 
surfaces in favor of the theory.126  Most of these persons do not so 
much as even use the word “separation” or any of its derivatives.  
There is a strong and viable argument one can make that these 
icons in American history supported disestablishment, which was 
not for them a notion synonymous with separation.127 
 
 124 2 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545–46 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950), reprinted in ROBERT T. MILLER 
& RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT app. A, at 584–85 (3d ed. 1987). 
 125 GODLESS CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 92. 
 126 See SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 7.  I would challenge the 
reader to examine each of the selections in this work and to discover for him or herself the 
truth of my observation that the founders rarely, if ever, advocate “separation.”  One dis-
covers in most of these writings an opposition to forced religion or to laws pertaining to 
worship, along with a commensurate favoring of the view that religious freedom is an in-
alienable right over which civil authorities have no power.  But one does not find these 
men advocating the notion of separation or of a “godless” public life. 
 127 This observation is generally in agreement with the observation of Hamburger, 
who describes the doctrine of separation as primarily a phenomenon of the nineteenth 
century.  See SEPARATION, supra note 104, at 78, 111.  The observation also agrees with 
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5.  Closing Observation about Jefferson 
There is significant evidence to suggest that Jefferson did 
not favor a secular public sphere of the sort that Kramnick and 
Moore envision and support.  My purpose here, however, is not to 
state whether he did or did not do so, but simply to demonstrate 
that these authors do not convincingly prove their point about 
the third President.  Appeals to Jefferson’s beliefs and practices 
can militate as easily against a godless state as in favor of one. 
6.  The Subversion of the Secular Ideal 
Madison supported the appointment of congressional chap-
lains when he served in the House of Representatives.128  He also, 
during his Presidency, proclaimed a national day of public hu-
miliation and prayer.129  There is evidence that, after he left of-
fice, he came to regard both actions as violations of the Estab-
lishment Clause and as deviations from the godless 
Constitution.130  The matter appears finally to boil down to a 
choice of whether to agree with the public or the private Madi-
son.  This choice resembles a leap into darkness, for there are no 
magical, brightly illuminated guideposts pointing one to the de-
finitive meaning of the Establishment Clause.  Yet the burden of 
proof, it should be remembered, is usually shouldered by the one 
whose thesis is under consideration.  When Kramnick and Moore 
argue that Madison’s religious proclamation was retrogressive 
and outside the orbit of the Establishment Clause, their assess-
ment is based upon little more than a body of checkered evidence 
that just as readily lends itself to the opposite point of view. 
Furthermore, when these authors describe the introduction 
of religious beliefs into the national currency, the movement and 
delivery of the mail, and the national Pledge of Allegiance as un-
 
the analysis of Daniel Dreisbach, who points out that New England Baptists (like Isaac 
Backus and John Leland) did not regard “separation” and “nonestablishment” as inter-
changeable.  See JEFFERSON AND THE WALL, supra note 114, at 51. 
 128 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 104–05 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).  Compare GODLESS 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 105, where the authors state that Madison “also opposed, 
unsuccessfully, the appointing of chaplains to Congress.”  The statement glosses over the 
fact that Madison did not apparently oppose the action while he was in Congress. 
 129 If the issuance of the proclamation was a mistake as Kramnick and Moore argue, 
it was one that President Madison continued to make.  He issued such proclamations 
throughout his Presidency.  See 1 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 513, 532–33, 558, 560–61 
(1896). 
 130 See James Madison, A Detached Memorandum, in SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE, supra note 7, at 138, 141.  In this writing, Madison stated that the appointment of 
chaplains for institutions of state “shut the door of worship [against] the members whose 
creeds and consciences forbid a participation in [the religion] of the majority.” Id. at 139.  
He maintained that “[r]eligious proclamations by the Executive recommending thanksgiv-
ings & fasts are shoots from the same root . . . .”  Id. at 141. 
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dermining the godless Constitution and the secular state, one 
must ask when and by whom such a standard of measurement 
was ever conclusively established.  Kramnick and Moore cer-
tainly have not established it.  Unless and until godlessness in 
public life becomes the proven and/or accepted standard, episodes 
of religious expression in American public life undermine noth-
ing. 
If those like Robert Bellah131 and Sidney Mead132 are correct, 
there has always been a religious dimension in American public 
life.  Whether one refers to this aspect of the country’s communal 
existence as a “civil religion”133 is not really important.  What 
Bellah and Mead suggest is that there is a wellspring of national 
spirituality, which in turn involves a belief in a deity.  Assuming 
that one agrees with them on this score, as many do,134 the very 
episodes that Kramnick and Moore decry as departures from the 
standard, other commentators might applaud as reflective of it. 
E.  Conclusion of Analysis 
It appears doubtful whether any historical inquiry into this 
matter will ever render an uncontested verdict.  To expect an-
other outcome would be naïve.  Thus, for an answer to the que-
ries of who determined the standard as well as how and when 
they did so, we must turn our attention elsewhere. 
III.  SECULARIZATION AND THE SUPREME COURT 
A. The Completed Revolution  
One may at this juncture wish to ask, “Why, when the his-
torical evidence in favor of a secular state is checkered and far 
less than conclusive, do we have a secular state, or a public 
 
 131 See ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN 
TIME OF TRIAL 12 (1975); and Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND 
BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONALIST WORLD 168, 168–69 (Univ. of 
California Press 1991) (1970) [hereinafter Civil Religion]. 
 132 See SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN 
AMERICA 38–50 (1963) [hereinafter LIVELY EXPERIMENT]. 
 133 See Civil Religion, supra note 131, at 168.  See also JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 176–87 (M. Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762), where 
the author is the first to have used the term. 
 134 See, for example, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, supra note 49, at 282 (quoting  JOHN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 131 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Mas-
ters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978) (1762)),  in which Lambert writes the following: 
Many other Americans professed Christianity but, like Jefferson, embraced a 
civil religion that excluded or ignored many tenets central to Christian ortho-
doxy.  Jefferson, Adams, Washington, Franklin, and Hamilton all expressed 
some version of what Rousseau called “civil religion”: a belief in “the existence 
of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foresighted, and providential divinity; the 
afterlife; the happiness of the just; the punishment of the wicked; [and] the 
sanctity of the social contract.” 
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sphere closely resembling one?”135  The answer is that there has 
already been a successfully executed “secular revolution”136 in 
this country.  It was, except for some of its details, completed by 
the turn of the twentieth century and involved virtually every 
aspect of American culture, including but not limited to educa-
tion, the natural sciences, and law.137  The insurgents, compris-
ing the nation’s intelligentsia, embraced naturalism, material-
ism, positivism, and the privatization, if not extinction, of 
religion.138  They rebelliously gave birth to a novel social para-
digm in this country that embodied their modes of thought and 
that soon came to dominate American public life. 
Current culture skirmishes, which have been recently evi-
denced, may perhaps be interpreted as little more than a bother-
some footnote to the culture war that has already been fought 
and won.  But such skirmishes may also signal a new counter-
insurgency, which is uneasy about the direction of American pub-
lic life under a secular paradigm and ready to mount its over-
throw. 
1.  Education 
For more than five hundred years in Western Civilization, 
 
 135 The observation of Stephen B. Presser is correct.  He reviews Kramnick’s and 
Moore’s book and states: “There is more than a little that is curious about this book, be-
cause its breathlessly-advanced thesis, that ours is a ‘Godless Constitution,’ now seems to 
be the well-established view of a majority of members of the United States Supreme 
Court.” Stephen B. Presser, Some Realism about Atheism: Responses to The Godless Con-
stitution, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 87, 89–90 (1997) (reviewing ISAAC KRAMNICK AND R. 
LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION (1996)).  The curiosity really concerns the 
Court.  Why does it tend to favor secularization when an examination of the early history 
of the Republic on the matter of church-state relations does not lead ineluctably to the 
conclusion that secularization must be favored? 
 136 See Christian Smith, Introduction to THE SECULAR REVOLUTION, at 1–4 (Christian 
Smith ed., Univ. of California Press 2003) [hereinafter SECULAR REVOLUTION], in which 
he uses and defends this term.  
 137 Even Protestantism itself became a secularizing influence.  Its Holy Scriptures 
were interpreted through the lens of the discipline of psychology.  See Keith G. Meador, 
“My Own Salvation”: The Christian Century and Psychology’s Secularizing of American 
Protestantism, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 134, at 269, 296, where the author, 
describing the first few decades of Protestantism during the twentieth century,  states 
that “parts of American Protestantism were becoming difficult to distinguish from the 
secular alternative of psychology, and many American Protestants began to forego tradi-
tional religious practices entirely in favor of a more direct alleviation of suffering from the 
psychologists, whom even churches hailed as the true ‘physicians of the soul.’” Charles 
Clayton Morrison, the first editor of the Christian Century, wrote retrospectively with re-
gret in 1939 of the  breakdown of his religious belief system in the immediate aftermath of 
the secular revolution: “Its [i.e., any religious phenomenon’s] objectivity as something 
given to me from beyond myself, had been reduced to my own subjective processes.”  Id. at 
297 (quoting How My Mind Has Changed, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 8, 1939, at 1370, 
1371).  Morrison’s progressive brand of Christianity had brought him to an ideological 
place respecting religion the same as or similar to that of scientists, educators, and law 
professors. 
 138 Christian Smith, Introduction to THE SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 1. 
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the Christian Church was in charge of education.139  Throughout 
seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and most of nineteenth-century Amer-
ica, the Church’s role in education predominated over all others.  
Harvard, Yale, William & Mary, and Princeton were established 
as religious institutions, the primary purpose of which was to 
produce and to train clergy.140  Most American colleges estab-
lished during this time were the work of Christian denomina-
tions, and so, naturally, their clergy possessed both teaching and 
administrative responsibilities in these educational institu-
tions.141  By the end of the nineteenth century, clergy involve-
ment in colleges and universities had declined.142  Higher educa-
tion was, by then, no longer under the control of the Church. 
A large part of this turn of events is explicable in terms of 
European modes of thought that began flourishing approximately 
a century earlier.  Immanuel Kant propounded his critical phi-
losophy in Germany during the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries.  He distinguished between empirical knowledge 
and faith.  The former was related to the world of sense percep-
tion and had to do with mathematical and physical science.  The 
latter was unbounded by sense and had to do with the move-
ments of the mind.  Although Kant correlated the notions of God, 
freedom, and immortality with morality, it was clear that, for 
him, these and other moral ideas and maxims possessed a cogni-
tive status fundamentally different from those of science.  He 
limited knowledge, he professed, to make room for faith.  It was 
this dichotomy of knowledge and faith that was of immense sig-
nificance for the secular revolution. 
Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, who followed Kant in 
the nineteenth century, built upon this dichotomy, each in his 
own way.  Comte envisioned a progression in human knowledge, 
with the mind passing first through a theological stage, followed 
by a metaphysical one, and then attaining its fullest flower in the 
ideal of positivism, which he maintained is exemplified by natu-
ral science.  No longer should one attempt to explain phenomena 
by resorting to the realm of the supernatural (theology) or to 
causal forces inherent within phenomena (metaphysics).  Science 
of the kind that occupied Galileo, Kepler, and Newton is con-
cerned with providing explanations, based upon observation, of 
the relations between observable facts.  Positivism, then, for 
Comte, has to do with real, certain, and exact knowledge, which 
 
 139 Christian Smith, Secularizing American Higher Education, in SECULAR 
REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 97. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 97–101. 
 142 Id. at 101. 
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embodies mathematics, natural sciences, and sociology. 
Spencer accepted the proposition that there is a realm of ex-
perience and a realm not experienced.  The latter realm is the 
one properly associated with religious belief, which cannot be 
tested or quantified empirically.  Theism, pantheism, and athe-
ism all fail for the same reason: they cannot be related to or cor-
related with experience.  Agnosticism, according to Spencer, is 
the only viable option religiously and metaphysically.  Spencer 
also rejected all theological systems and was equally critical of 
the religious institutions promulgating them. 
Christian Smith stresses the heavy impact of Comte and 
Spencer upon American academicians and higher education.  He 
writes, “Both [thinkers] provided what proved to be key intellec-
tual tools utilized by rising academic elites seeking to displace re-
ligious authority in order to make room for themselves as new, 
secular cultural authorities.”143 
Smith also points out that, during the nineteenth century, 
over ten thousand American scholars studied at German univer-
sities, the most secularized institutions in the world at the time, 
and brought back to this country German idealism, historicism, 
and rationalism,144 each of which was opposed, if not outrightly 
hostile, to a traditionally religious worldview.  Academic faculty 
members, like John Dewey145 who had thoroughly immersed him-
self in Kant’s philosophy and Hegelian idealism, resented any 
parochial or sectarian standard in education and thought of relig-
ion as belonging only to one’s personal and private life.  Such 
academicians fought for what they perceived as intellectual 
autonomy, opposing the denominational grip on higher education 
that was at its tightest during the 1880s and 90s.146 
In addition, institutions like Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and 
Cornell were under the leadership of Charles Eliot, Daniel Coit 
Gilman, and Andrew Dickson White, respectively, all of whom 
were educational reformers who worked assiduously to marginal-
ize religion in the academic curriculum and to further what they 
were convinced was genuine knowledge.147 
Aside from the above-described ideological shift, the nine-
teenth century saw the flourishing of capitalism, which fueled 
secularization.  Corporate capitalism was not interested in classi-
 
 143 Christian Smith, Secularizing American Higher Education, in SECULAR 
REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 97, 101. 
 144 Id. at 101–02. 
 145 Id. at 103. 
 146 Id. at 102–03. 
 147 Id. at 103. 
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cally-educated students, but in those who were trained in busi-
ness, law, engineering, and the material sciences; in those who 
could, in short, generate capital.148  As Smith puts it, “[c]apital-
ism thus undercut the justification for the scholarly task of a col-
lege system that privileged religious knowledge in its education, 
bolstering instead a rationale for a kind of technical, instrumen-
tal scholarship that was at the very least indifferent to religious 
concerns and interests.”149  Secular research universities soon 
began to supplant denominational colleges as the dominant insti-
tutions of higher education.150 
The marginalization of religion in higher education soon 
characterized the local public schools as well.  During the middle 
of the nineteenth century, educators like Horace Mann were out-
spokenly in favor of religious instruction in public schools.151  
They believed, like James Pyle Wickersham once did, that 
“[s]chools in this country should train the young to be reli-
gious.”152  But, by the mid-1870s and 80s, the National Education 
Association (NEA), which had become membered with those of a 
secular mindset, went on the attack against teaching religion, 
i.e., a common Protestant Christianity, in public schools.153  Edu-
cational elites, consisting of many local school superintendents as 
well as faculty and administrators of many major universities, 
joined the NEA and worked to remove religion from public 
schools.154  William Torrey Harris, superintendent of schools in 
St. Louis, Missouri, was one of those who fervently opposed reli-
gious teaching in public schools and became a fierce advocate for 
secular public education.155 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, only hints of the 
old religious system remained in public schools.  It had been a po-
litical struggle, Kraig Beyerlein maintains, and “the educational 
secularizers in the [NEA] had won.”156 
2.  Science 
Secularization in the sciences unfolded during the nine-
teenth century as a conflict between positivism and Baconian-
 
 148 Christian Smith, Introduction, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 76. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Kraig Beyerlein, Educational Elites and the Movement to Secularize Public Educa-
tion, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 160, 176. 
 151 Id. at 163. 
 152 Id. at 165  (emphasis omitted) (quoting NTA Proceedings 606 (1866)). 
 153 Id. at 169. 
 154 Id. at 170. 
 155 Id. at 174–75. 
 156 Id. at 193. 
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ism.157  The primary goal of the latter was to gather facts through 
close, honest, and refined observation.158  The idea of Baconian-
ism was that, as taxonomy grew, it would demonstrate the uni-
versal laws of God.159  Yet just as facts came through observation, 
they could also be received from God through revelation.160  Ac-
cording to Baconian science, science and religion were two sides 
of the very same coin.161  There was a “permeable boundary” be-
tween the two.162 
Men like Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin, and Thomas 
Huxley were stalwart representatives of the positivist approach 
to scientific pursuit.163  They flatly rejected Baconian premises.  
Religion, for them, had nothing to do with science; thus, the 
clergy had no right to speak with authority regarding scientific 
questions. 
Edward L. Youmans, a personal friend and disciple of 
Spencer as well as an evolutionist, thought that it was time to 
disseminate positivist ideas on a popular basis.  Popular Science 
Monthly was Youmans’s brainchild.  He prevailed upon William 
Henry Appleton, of publishing fame, to underwrite the publica-
tion.164  It sold at least eleven thousand copies a month and be-
came the leading purveyor of popular scientific ideas during the 
last part of the nineteenth century.165 
The various authors featured in this periodical, as well as in 
other periodicals such as Scientific American, declared war on 
biblical literalism.166  Scripture, they argued, resembled poetry 
and art more than science,167 and widespread religious claims 
demonstrate at best that humans possess spiritual faculties 
which generate such claims.168  The result of such arguments 
against religion resulted in a slow, but devastating erosion of Ba-
conianism’s credibility.  The religious texts to which it subscribed 
came to be viewed by many as nothing more than an artistic ac-
complishment169 and certainly not as a source of scientific truth.  
 
 157 Eva Marie Garroutte, The Positivist Attack on Baconian Science and Religious 
Knowledge in the 1870s, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 197. 
 158 Id. at 198. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 199. 
 161 See id. (commenting on the Baconian view that science (nature) and religion (the 
biblical text) are “complementary and absolutely noncontradictory,” and that “scientists 
and theologians could apply the very same scientific method to the study of both”). 
 162 Id. at 200. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 201. 
 166 Id. at 204. 
 167 Id. at 205. 
 168 Id. at 206. 
 169 Id. at 205. 
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Later, as the subjectivity of language surfaced as a major prob-
lem in hermeneutics, criticism rose to a new height when such 
commentators expressed the idea that perhaps the words of 
Scripture were more about the thoughts of those who had writ-
ten, and were presently interpreting, them than about the mind 
of deity.170  The upshot of the matter was that positivists urged 
devotees of religion “to abandon the delusion that they possess 
facts”171 and to withdraw from scientific discourse, especially 
when they have their Bibles in hand. 
By attacking the religious basis of Baconian science, the 
positivists had “made themselves the sole inheritors of the right 
to control the intellectual territory from which they had success-
fully displaced religious interests.”172  This accomplishment did 
not go unnoticed, but “reverberated through most other institu-
tional fields in American society.”173  Henceforth, scientific 
knowledge would be king of the realm, while religious claims 
would be relegated to virtual irrelevancy. 
3.  Law   
The secularization of law was a drama that unfolded in two 
major parts.  The first pitted the “science of law” movement, rep-
resented by men such as Christopher Langdell, Samuel Williston, 
and Jeremiah Smith, against a jurisprudence in which commu-
nity and religious notions of justice were creatively incorporated 
into common law.174  The science of law protagonists were strug-
gling, as the name of their movement indicates, to define law as 
“science.”175  Science, after all, had become the gold standard for 
knowledge.  The champions of this new legal movement were law 
professors, who desired to view themselves as scientists and pur-
veyors of knowledge.  Their laboratories were none other than 
law schools that were located in or near the universities where 
they taught.176 
The second part of the drama was cast as a conflict between 
so-called legal realists,177 like Oliver Wendell Holmes, John 
 
 170 Id. at 207–08. 
 171 Id. at 210. 
 172 Id. at 213. 
 173 Id. 
 174 David Sikkink, From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in 
SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 310. 
 175 Id. at 314.  The author writes that “the classical reformers [those in the science of 
law movement] pursued a science of law that was meant to parallel botany or other physi-
cal sciences.”  Id. 
 176 Those representing the science of law were also convinced that “a university, and 
a university alone, can furnish every possible facility for teaching and learning” legal sci-
ence.  Id at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 177 See id. at 334.  See also JURISPRUDENCE: TEXTS AND READINGS ON THE 
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Chipman Gray, and Roscoe Pound on the one hand, and formal-
ists, like advocates of the science of law such as Langdell178 on 
the other.  The legal realists insisted that law was an organic 
phenomenon, the study of which could not be divorced from po-
litical and social fact.  Law was not, as the formalists believed, 
about the meticulous gathering and organization of principles 
from legal reporters, because this approach undermined its na-
ture as a living, breathing reality always shaped in a particular 
social context. 
The winners of the first struggle were those representing the 
science of law.  David Sikkink emphasizes that they succeeded in 
“delegitimating the religious basis for legal decision making.”179  
They attacked the jurisprudence of the heart and its appeal to re-
ligion, substituting for it the “pure gaze of the scientific law pro-
fessor.”180 
But these legal reformers were not altogether dismissive of 
religion.  The law, they insisted, must be “discovered.”  It there-
fore possessed a transcendent aspect; it was as if they claimed a 
“direct line to God’s mind through their knowledge of the princi-
ples of legal science.”181  But they were comfortable speaking only 
of “general religion” or “general Christianity.”182  Although theirs 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (George C. Christie ed. 1973).  Christie states that “legal realism” 
possesses the following four characteristics: (1) a desire to separate law from morality in 
legal analysis, (2) a distrust of  legal formalism, i.e., deducing legal conclusions from rules 
of law, (3) a suspicion of all legal generalizations along with the desire to break them 
down into smaller units, and (4) a belief in the instrumental work that law can accom-
plish in society.  Id. at 641–42.  I use the term “legal realism” very broadly to include not 
only Holmes, Gray, and Pound, but also sociological jurisprudes like Louis Brandeis, Ben-
jamin Cardozo, Karl Llewellyn, Felix Cohen, and Jerome Frank.   
 178 Langdell was dean of the Harvard Law School and initiated the “case method” 
system of instruction.  This method, still followed in law schools today, 
rested on the concept that the law could be scientized as neatly and efficiently 
as chemistry or biology.  If one could isolate gases, observe their properties, 
and draw conclusions from which scientific principles could be developed, one 
ought to be able to bring the same logic to legal precedents, reach back into 
time for the earliest applicable cases and trace their progress, observe the 
properties of each, and from them develop constant legal principles . . . . 
LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES 208 (1991).  Holmes, convinced that law could not be properly studied divorced 
from pertinent political and social realities, despised “case method” instruction, thought it 
largely worthless, and stayed in law school only a year.  Id. at 208–09.  See also JEROME 
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 226 (1949), where he quotes Langdell, saying: “What qualifies a 
person to teach law . . . is not experience in the work of a lawyer’s office, not experience in 
dealing with men, not experience in the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in 
short, in using law, but experience in learning law. . . . ” 
 179 David Sikkink, From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in 
SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 316. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 316–17.  In Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), the 
Supreme Court referred to this country as “a Christian nation.”  But the reference, it 
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was not “that good old-time religion,” it was nevertheless one 
that molded character and conformed to the dictates of a general 
morality.183 
The winners of the second struggle were the legal realists.  
They were convinced that judges did not discover law, but were 
policymakers who create it.184  Holmes, who was representative 
of the group, argued that “[t]he ground of [a judicial] decision 
really comes down to a proposition of [social and political] pol-
icy.”185 
He and other realists, like Louis Brandeis and Benjamin 
Cardozo, were also empiricists to the core.  They were more im-
pressed by social and political differences than by unities and 
similarities.  Holmes believed, according to one biographer, that 
the “truth was only what he couldn’t help thinking on the basis of 
observation and experience, and his only absolute was an abso-
lute abhorrence of absolutes.”186  There were, for him, no eternal 
guideposts in law that imparted to it a transcendent dimension.  
It was and is located in a sea of relativism and, in the final 
analysis, is a product of human construction. 
Needless to say, Holmes was, in terms of religious faith, an 
agnostic.  There was little room in his judicial philosophy for a 
belief in God.187  Law was, in his view, separate and distinct from 
religion and morality, and simply “embodies the story of a na-
tion’s development through many centuries.”188 
His attack on legal formalism began in the nineteenth cen-
tury, but rolled onward, gathering momentum with new and 
powerful voices, through most of the twentieth century.  The 
eventual demise of formalism thoroughly secularized law in 
America.  Religion—general or otherwise—no longer had a pro-
tected place in this country’s public life.  The autonomy of the in-
 
should be noted, is couched in general, as opposed to sectarian, terms.   David Sikkink, 
From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra 
note 136, at 318. 
 183 David Sikkink, From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in 
SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 320. 
 184 Id. at 323. 
 185 Id. at 328 (quoting WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937, at 180 (1998)). 
 186 Id. at 327 (quoting LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 11 (1991)). 
 187 Id. at 324.  Holmes was a well-read man, who had studied and been influenced by 
both Comte and Spencer.  See id. at 325.  In Lochner v. New York, he wrote, “The 14th 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”  198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 188 David Sikkink, From Christian Civilization to Individual Civil Liberties, in 
SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 327 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path 
of the Law, 10 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 457–78 (1897)). 
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dividual, along with the capitalization of individual civil rights, 
came to the forefront in jurisprudence.  One’s beliefs regarding 
religion amounted to a private, individual right.  The state’s func-
tion was to remain religion-neutral, while at the same time pro-
tecting those whose religious liberties were infringed.189    
4.  Summary Observation   
It should not be overlooked that the Court’s emphasis upon 
individual autonomy and state neutrality coincided with the 
modes of thought of traditional liberalism.  Just as the seculari-
zation of higher education ultimately owed a profound debt to 
Kant190 as one of the primary architects of liberal thought, and 
the secularization of science built upon the dichotomy in his 
thought between empirical knowledge and faith, the seculariza-
tion of law illustrated, first, the attempt to redefine itself as a 
formalistic science so as to be regarded as a discipline of knowl-
edge that was worthy of the university and, second, after this at-
tempt failed, to cast itself as the means of safeguarding individ-
ual autonomy against collectivist forces, such as those of  
religion, which were thought to militate against the spirit of the 
individual.  The secular revolution was one, in the final analysis, 
about politics.  It represented the triumph of political liberalism. 
B.   Supreme Court Cases and Establishment Tests 
Around the middle of the twentieth century, after the secular 
revolution was already won and the brightest legal minds in the 
country had effectively concluded that religion should have at 
best a marginal role in American public life, the Supreme Court 
received an opportunity to express its newfound sense of the rela-
tionship between religion and the state.191 
1.  Constitutionalizing the Wall   
The question before the Court was whether a township in 
New Jersey could, without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment,192 tax its citizens for the costs of transport-
ing children to church schools.193  Justice Black, speaking for the 
majority of the Court, answered the question in the affirmative, 
 
 189 Elsewhere I have described the strong emphasis upon autonomy in the Court’s 
interpretation of the Religion Clauses.  See From Typology to Synthesis, supra note 81. 
 190 For a lengthy discussion of Kant’s liberalism and its influence upon jurisprudence, 
see L. Scott Smith, Religion-Neutral Jurisprudence: An Examination of Its Meanings and 
End, 13 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL 815, 823–39 (2005) [hereinafter “Relig-
ion-Neutral” Jurisprudence]. 
 191 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 192 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
 193 Everson, 330 U.S. at 5. 
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but in the course of doing so spelled out the meaning of the Es-
tablishment Clause as follows: 
  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or pre-
fer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence a person 
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to 
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be punished 
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance.  No tax in any amount, large or small, 
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, what-
ever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or 
practice religion.  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, 
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organiza-
tions or groups and vice versa.  In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall 
of separation between church and State.”194 
Justice Black emphasized that the individual is free to ac-
cept or to reject religious belief and that all governmental enti-
ties, whether local, state, or federal, must remain neutral, nei-
ther favoring nor disfavoring any religious persuasion.195  In 
support of his opinion, Justice Black invoked not only Jefferson’s 
celebrated metaphor of “a wall of separation,” but also “Virginia’s 
Bill for Religious Liberty,” authored by the same patriot. 
2.  The Advent of the Lemon Test   
In the cases that followed Everson, the Court declared un-
constitutional a number of attempts by government to interject 
religion into public life.  Based upon such decisions, the Court 
was able to formulate, almost a quarter of a century after Ever-
son, what became known as the “Lemon test” for determining Es-
tablishment Clause violations.  The test mandated that, in order 
to pass scrutiny (1) a statute have a secular purpose, (2) there be 
no evidence that the statute’s principal effect is to advance or to 
inhibit religion, and (3) the statute not foster excessive entan-
glement between government and religion.196  The primary goal 
of this three-pronged test was to ensure that religion and the af-
fairs of state be separate from each other.  Religion was relegated 
to a private sphere of American life separate and distinct from 
the public one, where issues of state are debated and decided and 
its business is administered.197 
 
 194 Id. at 15–16. 
 195 Id. at 18. 
 196 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 197 The following cases are but a few in which the Lemon test was applied: Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), where the posting of the Ten Commandments in public 
school classrooms was held to violate the Establishment Clause; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38 (1985), where the authorization of a period of silence “for meditation or voluntary 
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3.  The Endorsement Test   
Thereafter, Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion in 
Lynch v. Donnelly,198 a case that involved whether a crèche dis-
played on public property in Pawtucket, Rhode Island during the 
holiday season violated the Establishment Clause, suggested 
that the Lemon test be modified and recast as an “endorsement 
test.”  According to Justice O’Connor, the question to ask, first 
off, is whether the government intends by a specific practice to 
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion; sec-
ondly, whether the practice has the effect of communicating a 
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion; and thirdly, 
whether there is institutional entanglement between religion and 
the government.199  This test was subsequently utilized by the 
Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh.200  It is 
not appreciably different from the Lemon test in terms of at-
tempting to insulate the state’s business from any expression of 
religion.  The goal was, at bottom, to safeguard the secular na-
ture of all state endeavors, which are largely co-extensive with 
American public life. 
4.  The Coercion Test   
Subsequently, the Court in Lee v. Weisman,201 a case involv-
ing whether a rabbi offering a nonsectarian prayer at a school 
commencement ceremony violated the Establishment Clause, ad-
vanced its “coercion test.”  The Court explained that a state may 
not place any student at a school-sponsored event in the position 
of either participating in or protesting a religious activity.  A per-
son cannot, in short, be coerced; he or she cannot be made to feel 
 
prayer” was held to violate the Establishment Clause; PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973), in which New York statutory amendments providing for (1) maintenance and re-
pair of school facilities and equipment to insure the health, welfare and safety of pupils, 
(2) a tuition grant program, and (3) a tax benefit program for those failing to qualify for 
tuition reimbursement, and largely for the benefit of Roman Catholic schools and their 
students were declared violations of the Establishment Clause; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 
U.S. 349 (1975), where sections of the Pennsylvania Public School Code were stricken 
down as offenses against  the Establishment Clause insofar as they provided instructional 
material, equipment, and auxiliary services to parochial schools; Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 229 (1977), in which an Ohio statute was held to violate the Establishment Clause by 
providing instructional materials, equipment, and field trip expense to parochial schools; 
and Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), in which a Louisiana statute providing 
that there could be no teaching of the theory of evolution unless it was accompanied by 
instruction in “creation science” was held a violation of the Establishment Clause. 
 198 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 199 Id. at 689–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 200 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a crèche displayed by itself on public premises is 
a violation of the Establishment Clause). 
 201 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  The Court followed Lee in Santa Fe v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 
(2000), in which the Court struck down a Texas school district’s policy of allowing a stu-
dent chaplain to pray at school football games. 
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like an outsider in an activity that is sponsored by an instrumen-
tality of the state.  The thrust of the coercion test was to defend 
individual autonomy by protecting the secular character of any 
activity in which the state is involved.202 
5.  The Historical Test   
These three tests, whenever the Court desires, have been se-
lectively used and then abandoned by it when considering estab-
lishment violations.  A state act or practice can, rather mysteri-
ously to some observers, be evaluated in terms of the antiquity of 
the practice involved.  The Court, for example, decided that the 
Nebraska Legislature’s eighteen-year practice of hiring a Protes-
tant clergyman to open each day’s legislative session with a 
prayer was not contrary to the demands of religious freedom or 
disestablishment.203  Such decisions left pundits wondering what 
factors determined which test would be applicable in future con-
tests.  Predictability in Establishment Clause cases largely van-
ished and an apparent case by case approach fast became the 
predominant rule, if there ever was one.204 
Could it be that the Court’s wavering approach to the anti-
establishment norm indicated a largely subjective jurisprudence 
that was more concerned, in the spirit of Justice Holmes, with 
charting political policy than with attempting to measure, ac-
cording to the rationale of a Christopher Langdell, some sup-
posed Constitutional truth?  It is to the political implications of 
the Court’s jurisprudence that we turn next. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Justice Black and the Everson Decision 
1.  Everson and the “Wall of Separation”   
The Everson205 decision does not demonstrate the slightest 
attempt to understand Jefferson’s correspondence with the Dan-
bury Baptists, nor does the decision acknowledge any possible 
differences between the meaning that Jefferson imparted to the 
“wall of separation” and that which the Court gave to it.  It ap-
pears that Justice Black appropriated the metaphor in a manner 
that was not only foreign to the third President’s meaning and 
purpose, but to his political philosophy as well. 
Critics may hasten to observe that it is hardly remarkable 
 
 202 Lee, 505 U.S. at 588. 
 203 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 785–86 (1983). 
 204 From Typology to Synthesis, supra note 81, at 51–53. 
 205 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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for the Court, or for a Justice who has served on it, to make crea-
tive use of history and legal precedent in order to support or to 
oppose any given point-of-view.  That is correct, but before incor-
porating a metaphor into the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment, is it too much to expect that a modest exegesis of 
the metaphor’s meaning inform the endeavor? 
When Jefferson utilized this phrase, there are numerous 
reasons to suggest he was attempting to point out that the na-
tional government had no power over religious concerns.  Bap-
tists, who had been sadly persecuted in New England and else-
where for their dissident beliefs, desired assurances from the 
new President that he would support religious freedom and not 
the establishment of a national church.  Might it be that he was 
attempting to give them this assurance in his now famous letter 
and, again, in his Second Inaugural Address?  In the latter, he 
stated, 
  In matters of religion I have considered that its free exercise is 
placed by the Constitution independent of the powers of the General 
Government.  I have therefore undertaken on no occasion to prescribe 
the religious exercises suited to it, but have left them, as the Constitu-
tion found them, under the direction and discipline of the church or 
state authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies.206 
In view of such evidence, it is at best problematic to advocate 
that Jefferson meant by the metaphor to propose a thoroughly 
secular public life.  He appeared to believe that the regulation of 
religion was best left to the individual states and to religious in-
stitutions themselves. 
I am not dogmatically urging that the meaning of Jefferson’s 
letter to the Baptists is a settled one; it is an open question ad-
mitting of diverse historical judgments.  One may even allow, for 
the sake of argument and in accordance with the view of some 
historians, that Justice Black’s appropriation of Jefferson’s lan-
guage is on the correct side of the argument.  This allowance 
notwithstanding, the point is that the Justice’s treatment of the 
issue is far from historically serious.  One can only guess how he 
might have responded to the observation made in this Article, 
that Jefferson took up the metaphor in an attempt to limit na-
tional power, while his (Justice Black’s) own purpose was un-
questionably to expand it. 
2.  Everson and Politics   
This brings one to the crux of the matter: the most salient 
fact about the majority decision in Everson is that it was a politi-
 
 206 Second Inaugural, supra note 112, at para. 7. 
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cal one.  In its aftermath, the Supreme Court, thanks addition-
ally to the doctrine of incorporation,207 would be emboldened by 
its new authority to scrutinize all state action regarding religion 
and, in turn, to outlaw any manifestation of religious devotion 
that was co-mingled with a state-sponsored activity.  The deci-
sion brought increased power to the Court by giving it a police 
function that allowed the Court essentially to redefine appropri-
ate secular standards in the states and to assure that they be 
met.  Everson, in short, had everything to do with politics and lit-
tle, if anything, to do with a critical reading of history. 
3.  Everson and the Secular Revolution   
The secular standards that Everson concretely laid down 
were far from new.  They were not the product of the Court’s in-
genuity.  They were part and parcel of the secular revolution that 
had already been accomplished in this country by the turn of the 
twentieth century and that had transformed Europe a century 
before that.  Immanuel Kant had dichotomized reason, which, he 
insisted, had two spheres; one contained knowledge (with a sen-
sible content), while the other comprised thinking (without it).  
The former was a theoretical realm of science and progress, 
whereas the latter was a practical one of metaphysics, morals, 
and religion.  Science possessed a public character, while religion 
was relegated to personal and private life.  The state, according 
to Kant, had no right to impose any religious or moral beliefs 
upon its citizens.  It was to honor each person’s individual auton-
omy. 
The Everson decision constitutionalized not only Jefferson’s 
metaphor, but also imparted to it the thought patterns of the 
secular revolution.  Everson dictated that religious concerns and 
state concerns would forevermore be separate and distinct from 
each other.  The state would not interfere with the autonomy of 
the individual in religious matters, but would be “a neutral in its 
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.”208  
What was more, the public square would be free of religion; spe-
cifically, of any form of religious expression in schools and school-
sponsored events.  Nonsectarian prayer and devotional Bible-
reading without comment, released time programs for religious 
instruction, and any religious holiday displays would henceforth 
be regarded as imposing and coercive, as the illicit importation of 
private matters of faith into the public square.  What the Everson 
decision did not state, even though it was written in large print 
between the lines, was that the Establishment Clause was to be 
 
 207 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 208 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
299-358 SMITH.DOC 5/30/2007 9:58:56 PM 
338 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:299 
construed through the lens of the political dogma of liberalism, 
dating back at least to Kant and provided new twists by Comte 
and Spencer. 
B.  The Central Notions of Liberalism 
The problem with liberalism has to do with its central no-
tions, such as state neutrality and individual autonomy.  Else-
where I have analyzed these ideas,209 and I will not attempt to 
recapitulate here my previous discussions concerning them, other 
than briefly to point out that state neutrality constitutes an im-
possibility and that individual autonomy, when divorced from 
moral and religious boundaries, lends itself to anarchy and 
chaos. 
Consider for a moment the situation in a public school class-
room, in which there is no school prayer, devotional Bible-
reading, singing of Christmas carols, display of the Ten Com-
mandments, or group recitation of “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance.  The silence is unquestionably audible.  Can even a 
distantly observant person think that this atmosphere does not 
convey a strong impression to a student concerning the signifi-
cance (or, better yet, the insignificance) of these activities in the 
life of the community and in his or her life as a public citizen?  If, 
on the other hand, such activities are part and parcel of the 
school curriculum, would any person dare defend them as “neu-
tral”?  State neutrality is a chimerical concept for law professors, 
philosophers, and Supreme Court justices to ponder and to make 
sense of, but it is a notion without clothing in the real world 
where people interact on a daily basis with one another. 
Consider too a scene that has become commonplace on the 
streets of every major city in this country.  A homeless drug-
addict is offered, but refuses, the assistance of healthcare profes-
sionals.  He or she “chooses” instead to continue living on a public 
sidewalk, where all his or her bodily functions are exercised.  
Does the idea of individual autonomy, unbounded by any and all 
moral and religious constraint, not inure to the society’s detri-
ment?  Is such a notion not tantamount to chaos?  A realm of per-
sonal, private autonomy free of any such constraint cannot be de-
fined consistent with the goals of freedom. 
State neutrality and individual autonomy, as incoherent as 
both are, nonetheless constitute pillars of the secular ideal.  It is 
this ideal that has inspired the Lemon, the endorsement, and the 
coercion tests.  The “godless” state, which supposedly epitomizes 
 
 209 See “Religion-Neutral” Jurisprudence, supra note 190, and From Typology to Syn-
thesis, supra note 81. 
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neutrality, exists to safeguard the individual autonomy of its citi-
zenry by insuring that their decision-making process is untram-
meled, however slightly, by the imposition of any moral or reli-
gious value that might, by happenstance or otherwise, creep into 
state-supported activity. Another name for this political regime, 
according to those who support it, is “the separation of church 
and state,” and among its many plaudits, is that it purportedly 
honors the memory of Thomas Jefferson and other American pa-
triots.  That is as historically suspect as its central notions are 
philosophically untenable. 
C.  The Epistemology of Liberalism 
The idea of two spheres, one secular, embodying the natural-
istic pursuit of knowledge, and the other religious, encompassing 
unverifiable belief and ritualistic practice, is not only unwork-
able, but  also rests upon epistemological premises that are thor-
oughly doubtful, if not altogether incorrect.  Kant and the other 
thinkers who shaped the secular revolution in both Europe and 
America were convinced that belief in God amounted to thinking 
and not knowing.210  Indeed, for Comte, religious belief of any 
kind was superstitious and infantile; and, according to Spencer, 
religious knowledge was impossible because there was no corre-
sponding empirical datum.  Without re-tracing arguments made 
elsewhere, it must suffice to observe that the argument that sci-
ence is intellectually rigorous and defensible, while religion is 
not, does not pass muster.  The “truths” of science are not eter-
nal.  They are not part of a sphere of certitude; hence, they can-
not be differentiated from religious claims in that fashion.  As 
Alvin Plantinga reminds us with a hint of humor, John 
Trowbridge, who was chairman of the department of physics at 
Harvard University in the 1880s, encouraged students not to ma-
jor in physics since most discoveries in the field had already been 
made;211 after all, there could be but one Newton as there was 
but one universe.  Plantinga also underscores the temporary 
character of scientific truth, when he writes as follows: “We all 
know of scientific theories that once enjoyed consensus but are 
now discarded: caloric theories of heat, effluvial theories of elec-
tricity and magnetism, theories based on the existence of phlogis-
ton, vital forces in physiology, theories of spontaneous generation 
of life, the luminiferous ether, and so on.”212 
 
 210 See “Religion-Neutral” Jurisprudence, supra note 190, at 836–39. 
 211 Alvin Plantinga, Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal, in DARWINISM, 
DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 519 (John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer eds., 
2003). 
 212 Id. 
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It is most interesting to note that Richard Rorty, one of to-
day’s stellar proponents of liberal thought as well as a devout 
atheist, explains that he is opposed to religion, but not on epis-
temological grounds.  He is quoted as stating the following: 
  I do not think that Christian theism is irrational.  I entirely 
agree . . . that it is no more irrational than atheism.  Irrationality is 
not the question but rather, desirability.  The only reason I can think 
of for objecting to Christian theism is that a lot of Christians have 
been bigoted fanatics.  But of course, so have a lot of atheists. . . . 
  . . . .  
  . . . Atheism is more practical only if you wish to form a pluralistic, 
democratic society.  In that situation, the persistence of the theist who 
claims to know that this or that is against God’s will becomes a prob-
lem.  So atheists find themselves wishing that these groups would 
wither away.213 
Is Rorty not effectively conceding, then, that it is indefensi-
ble to argue that Christian theism should partake of a separate 
sphere because it is more irrational and more fanatically sup-
ported than a godless ideology?  His point appears to be simply 
that atheism is more conducive to the formation of a democratic 
society.  But that is a strange argument, is it not, when most of 
those within American society describe themselves as “Chris-
tian?”  Rorty criticizes “the persistence of the theist who claims to 
know that this or that is against God’s will” but he does not dis-
approve of the atheist who claims to know that it is not. 
D.   A Political Choice 
The truth that pervades Rorty’s transparent observation is 
the same one that rose to the surface in our discussion of the 
secular revolution and in our consideration of the Court’s em-
brace of the liberal, secular ideal.  That truth concerns politics.  
When phrased in its most elemental fashion, the issue concerns 
the kind of state in which one desires to live.  Does one want to 
live in a secular state under a “godless Constitution,” where each 
individual is an autonomous end to him- or herself, and where 
autonomy may often move perilously close to chaos?  Or, alterna-
tively, does one wish to live in a state where basic moral and reli-
gious values, including the notion of deity, are upheld and pro-
moted, but where such values may create resentment and be 
experienced as an imposition?  There is nothing magical about 
this choice.  It need not, as I have demonstrated, be covered over 
with layer upon layer of historical investigation, philosophical 
 
 213 Stephen Louthan, On Religion—A Discussion with Richard Rorty, Alvin Plant-
inga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 27 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR’S REV. 177, 178, 183 (1996). 
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analysis, or judicial precedent-weighing.  The problem is one that 
cannot be fully resolved by resorting to any of these modes of 
thought.  Although they may contribute to the illumination of op-
tions, this does not alter the reality that the underlying problem 
involves making an easy to understand, even crudely simple, po-
litical choice. 
The choice is not a lopsided one, where only one of the com-
batants comes loaded with historical and empirical evidence and 
heavy intellectual muscle.  Except for the reality that traditional 
liberalism reigns as undisputed champion throughout most elite 
cultural institutions, like the academies of higher education, the 
media, and the Supreme Court, the match is, in most respects, an 
even contest.  One searches in vain for an eternal truth dictating 
that higher education must marginalize the religious impulse, 
that the pursuit of science must be inextricably tied to methodo-
logical naturalism,214 and that the law must be interpreted to 
mandate the secularization of the public square.  Nowhere is it 
written, except in the political philosophy of liberalism and its 
cousins, such as naturalism and instrumentalism,215 that reli-
gious thought has to be relegated to the nethermost regions of 
the mind and comprise what is ungraciously referred to, in politi-
cal terms, as personal and private, or merely “sectarian,” belief. 
The Supreme Court has not yet admitted what most pundits 
and political interest groups already know about it; namely, that 
the issues with which it, as an institution, must grapple boil 
down to a political struggle, pure and simple, and that the most 
significant measuring rod of where any Justice stands in the 
struggle concerns the way in which he or she understands the re-
lation of religious values to the state.  By and large, liberalism’s 
secular ideal still prevails on the Court, but there is reason to 
suspect that the ideal may no longer have the unconditional ap-
peal it once had.  To examine this contention, I now turn to the 
Court’s most recent decisions regarding the public display of the 
Ten Commandments. 
 
 214 See L. Scott Smith, On Teaching Neo-Darwinism in Public Schools: Avoiding the 
Pall of Orthodoxy and the Threat of Establishment, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 143, 
175–78 (2005).  See also Alvin Plantinga, When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and 
the Bible, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS: PHILOSOPHICAL, 
THEOLOGICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 113, 136–39 (Robert T. Pennock ed., MIT 
Press, 2001).  
 215 For an invigorating, thoughtful, and provocative discussion of the way in which 
education, science, and law have been conjoined with and defined by the philosophy of 
naturalism, see generally PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, REASON IN THE BALANCE: THE CASE 
AGAINST NATURALISM IN SCIENCE, LAW & EDUCATION (1995).  Naturalistic discourse is 
one of the byproducts of a public sphere from which religion is excluded. 
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V. THE PUBLIC DISPLAY OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS 
A. Introduction 
The Supreme Court, during the summer of 2005, handed 
down two decisions concerning the public display of the Ten 
Commandments and did so with diverse outcomes.  In the Van 
Orden decision, the Court held in favor of the display, but in the 
McCreary County decision held against it.  A consideration of the 
various opinions by the Justices will aid one in understanding 
where each of them stands regarding the relationship between 
the state and its embodiment of religious values.  More signifi-
cantly, we will also be able to observe how the Justices are en-
gaged in a political dispute, with the proponents of the liberal-
secular ideal on the one side and the advocates of a state embody-
ing some moral and religious values on the other. 
B. Van Orden v. Perry 
In Van Orden,216 the text of the Ten Commandments was 
displayed on a monument, six feet high and three feet wide, that 
was located on twenty-two acres surrounding the Texas state 
capitol and containing a number of other monuments and histori-
cal markers.217  Van Orden, the petitioner, sought first a declara-
tion that the monument violated the Establishment Clause, and 
second, an injunction for its removal.218  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote the plurality opinion, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas joined. 
1.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Plurality Opinion   
Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejecting Van Orden’s claims, ex-
plained that the Court’s decisions under the Establishment 
Clause attempt to address two concerns.  The first is historical 
and consists of the positive role of religion and religious tradi-
tions throughout the country’s history, while the second is phi-
losophical and embodies the principle that state intervention in 
religious matters can impede religious freedom.219  The challenge 
is to respect both concerns.  “Our institutions,” he reminded us, 
“presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these institutions must not 
press religious observances upon their citizens.”220  There must 
be a respect for history and for the principle of church-state sepa-
ration. 
 
 216 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
 217 Id. at 2858. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. at 2859. 
 220 Id. 
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The Chief Justice, for reasons he failed to explain, does not 
consider the Lemon test “useful in dealing with the sort of pas-
sive monument”221 involved in this case.  The test that seems to 
shape his opinion most was the one of Marsh v. Chambers222 that 
tends to measure, according to the antiquity of a religious prac-
tice, whether it has a place in American public life.  He recited 
profusely from President Washington’s Thanksgiving Day Proc-
lamation, in which the President announced an official day of 
prayer and thanksgiving to observe “with grateful hearts, the 
many and signal favors of Almighty God.”223  The Chief Justice 
further noted the public place of honor provided to Moses and the 
Decalogue within the Supreme Court’s own courtroom, as well as 
in the rotunda area of the Jefferson Building, on the floor of the 
National Archives, inside the Department of Justice, and in front 
of the Ronald Reagan Building.224  He was, of course, equally 
cognizant of legal precedents, like McGowan v. Maryland,225 in 
which the Ten Commandments have, at least in part, been up-
held in public life.  The Legislative and Executive branches, he 
maintained, have respectfully recognized the role of the Ten 
Commandments in America’s heritage.226 
The religious character of the Decalogue is openly acknowl-
edged in this opinion, but the Chief Justice stressed that “the 
Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning.”227  
It is really upon this “historical meaning” that his opinion turns.  
That the case involved neither primary nor secondary education 
and that Van Orden walked by the monument for a number of 
years before bringing his lawsuit were also facts deemed highly 
relevant to the opinion.228 
2.  Justice Thomas’s Concurrence   
Justice Thomas, concurring in the Chief Justice’s opinion, 
argued for returning “to the views of the Framers and adopt[ing] 
coercion as the touchstone”229 for interpreting the Establishment 
Clause.  In this context, “coercion” means one is compelled to 
take a particular action “by force of law and threat of penalty.”230  
In this sense, Van Orden was obviously not coerced, and there is 
 
 221 Id. at 2861. 
 222 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 223 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861. 
 224 Id. at 2862. 
 225 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
 226 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 2863–64. 
 229 Id. at 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 230 Id. at 2865 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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no cognizable establishment violation.231 
By recommending that the Court “return to the views of the 
Framers”232 and to “the original meaning”233 of the Establishment 
Clause, Justice Thomas supported a particular historical under-
standing of the Constitution; i.e., the view that it was written 
sympathetically to religion and was never intended to secularize 
all activities sponsored by the states.  He reminded us of the 
doubt he expressed in the Newdow case concerning whether the 
Establishment Clause is applicable to the states by reason of its 
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.234  He continued 
to leave the door ajar for the entertainment of this theoretical 
possibility, by writing: “If the Establishment Clause does not re-
strain the States, then it has no application here, where only 
state action is at issue.”235 
Reasons for adopting the method of originalism, he asserted, 
have to do in part with the inadequacies of the Lemon and en-
dorsement tests, which have brought even the most trivial ves-
tiges of the religious to the federal courthouse for litigation.236  
Both tests save religious words and symbols from being stricken 
down as establishment violations only by “declaring them of little 
religious significance.”237  His point is that, to pass constitutional 
muster, words and symbols, even when admittedly religious, 
must be justified in secular terms.  Such a compromise is unfair 
to believers and nonbelievers alike and results finally in judicial 
incoherence and confusion.238  The unintelligibility of the Court’s 
body of precedents in this area serves to highlight the eyebrow-
raising specter that Establishment Clause cases turn finally on 
“judicial predilections”239 or, in other words, on “the personal 
preferences of judges.”240 
3.  Justice Breyer’s Concurrence   
Concurring in the plurality’s judgment, Justice Breyer as-
serted that Establishment Clause cases are fact-intensive ones241 
and that there was and is “no test-related substitute for the exer-
cise of legal judgment.”242  He highlighted the following facts that 
 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 2867. 
 233 Id. at 2865. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. at 2865–66. 
 237 Id. at 2866. 
 238 Id.  
 239 Id. at 2867. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 242 Id. 
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were important to him in reaching his decision: specifically, that 
the monument was donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles to 
shape civic morality as a way of combating juvenile delin-
quency,243 that its physical setting suggests little or nothing that 
is religious,244 that for forty years the location of the monument 
on public property was unchallenged,245 and that the display was 
not on public school grounds.246  
After emphasizing what he regarded as decisive facts of the 
case, Justice Breyer weighed them against the Lemon test.  The 
Texas display, he thought, demonstrated no religious purpose, il-
lustrated that its primary effect was neither to advance nor to 
inhibit religion, and resulted in no excessive government entan-
glement with religion.  Although his opinion happened to coincide 
with the three prongs of the Lemon test,247 Justice Breyer in-
sisted that the formulation of his opinion rested upon a consid-
eration of the basic purposes of the Religion Clauses, i.e., to “as-
sure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance 
for all,”248 rather than upon the application of any particular test. 
4.  Justice Stevens’s Dissent   
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined in dis-
sent, took the position that the state of Texas, by agreeing to the 
placement of the monument on capitol grounds, endorsed “the di-
vine code of the ‘Judeo-Christian’ God.”249  Justice Stevens pas-
sionately opined, “[i]f any fragment of Jefferson’s metaphorical 
‘wall of separation between church and State’ is to be preserved—
if there remains any meaning to the ‘wholesome “neutrality” of 
which this Court’s [Establishment Clause] cases speak,’”250 then 
the subject display is unquestionably unconstitutional. 
Not only does the display constitute Texas’s endorsement of 
a divinely-given Code, but the state, argued Justice Stevens, is 
also unwittingly fueling a sectarian conflict concerning which 
version of the Code is the proper one, since the display features 
one version of it to the exclusion of others.251  If this were not 
enough constitutionally to condemn the display, one could like-
wise consider that it impermissibly prefers religion over irreli-
 
 243 Id. at 2870. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at 2871. 
 247 Id.  
 248 Id. at 2868 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 
(1963)). 
 249 Id. at 2874 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 250 Id. (quoting School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)). 
 251 Id. at 2879–80. 
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gion, such that nonbelievers and polytheists are made to feel like 
outsiders.252 
Justice Stevens reserved his most forceful criticism for those 
who advocate originalism.  First, he stated that the Founders’ 
speeches, some of them with prolific religious allusions, should 
not be interpreted as a direct reflection of the government’s posi-
tion on the church-state relationship, as would the “permanent 
placement of a textual religious display on state property.”253  
Second, he reminded us that religious statements and proclama-
tions were not espoused at the Constitutional Convention nor en-
shrined in the text of the founding document.254  Third, he ob-
served that historical investigation renders ambiguous results, 
noting that Jefferson refused to issue Thanksgiving proclama-
tions and that Madison, in his Detached Memorandum,255 later 
voiced disapproval of his public religious proclamations and of 
the appointment of Congressional chaplains at state expense.256  
Fourth, the Justice noted that many of the Framers understood 
the word “religion” in the Establishment Clause to include only 
Christian sects;257 thus, a return to the original meaning of the 
word would necessitate the exclusion of those in other religions.  
Fifth, he argued that the Establishment Clause narrowly con-
stricted to the national government and not applicable to state 
governments through the incorporation doctrine would mean 
that a state could “constitutionally adorn all of its public spaces 
with crucifixes or passages from the New Testament . . . [or] 
would also have full authority to prescribe the teachings of Mar-
tin Luther or Joseph Smith as the official state religion.”258 
Justice Stevens, in conclusion, emphasized, “[t]he principle 
that guides my analysis is neutrality.”259  It is a principle, he as-
serted, rooted in this country’s history as well as in the text of the 
Constitution.260 
5.  Justice Souter’s Dissent   
The thrust of Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, was that the Establishment Clause “requires neutral-
 
 252 Id. at 2881. 
 253 Id. at 2883. 
 254 Id. 
 255 James Madison, A Detached Memorandum, in SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE, supra note 7, at 138, 141. 
 256 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 257 Id. at 2885. 
 258 Id. at 2887. 
 259 Id. at 2889. 
 260 Id. 
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ity as a general rule.”261  Relying upon Stone v. Graham,262  Jus-
tice Souter stated that there is no doubt the Ten Commandments 
amount to a religious statement.263  When displayed on public 
property any such religious text constitutes a violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause, unless the circumstances of its display indi-
cate that it is not placed there “with a predominant purpose on 
the part of government either to adopt the religious message or to 
urge its acceptance by others.”264  In this instance, “the govern-
ment of Texas is telling everyone who sees the monument to live 
up to a moral code because God requires it.”265  Governmental 
neutrality, stressed the Justice, has been lost in this instance: 
“any citizen should be able to visit that civic home without hav-
ing to confront religious expressions clearly meant to convey an 
official religious position that may be at odds with his own relig-
ion, or with rejection of religion.”266 
Justice Souter distinguished between Texas’s display of the 
Decalogue and “any number of perfectly constitutional depic-
tions”267 of it, such as the frieze in the Justices’ own courtroom, 
on which Moses is secularly depicted as one lawgiver, among 
many, holding the tablets of the Commandments.268  Although 
the Texas display is one of numerous ones on the state capitol 
grounds, Justice Souter doubted the secular purpose of it, since 
he did not think that it is tied by appearance, history, or aes-
thetic sense to the other monuments, but stands on its own.269 
C.   McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky270 
1.  Introduction   
McCreary and Pulaski Counties, in the state of Kentucky, 
conspicuously displayed the King James version of the text of the 
Ten Commandments in their respective courthouses.271  After 
litigation was instituted by the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Kentucky against the two counties seeking to enjoin the displays, 
the counties each altered their displays on two separate occa-
sions, first by expanding the display272 and, second, by installing 
 
 261 Id. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 262 449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980) (holding that the mandatory posting of the Ten Com-
mandments in public classrooms violated the Establishment Clause). 
 263 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. at 2893 (citation omitted). 
 266 Id. at 2897. 
 267 Id. at 2894. 
 268 Id. at 2893–94. 
 269 Id. at 2895. 
 270 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
 271 Id. at 2728. 
 272 Id. at 2729. 
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another display that still featured the Commandments.273  In the 
second display, the Commandments were central to it, but were 
present along with eight small-framed documents bearing a reli-
gious theme.274  In the third display, set up after the district 
court had ordered the removal of the second one in each county, 
nine framed documents of equal size were posted.275  The third 
display was not set up pursuant to any new county resolution.276 
2.  Justice Souter’s Majority Opinion   
Justice Souter, with whom Justices Breyer, Stevens, Gins-
burg, and O’Connor joined, emphasized that the counties’ actions 
had no secular purpose and, hence, violated the “central Estab-
lishment Clause value of official religious neutrality,”277 still as 
important “an interpretative guide”278 as it was in Everson.279  
Reminding the two counties that “the world is not made brand 
new every morning,”280 the Court, by means of the fictional “ob-
jective observer”281 of the endorsement test, is free to examine the 
history of the counties’ various displays and to conclude that, 
when considered together, they demonstrated a definite govern-
mental purpose to advance a form of religion. 
Justice Souter criticized the originalism of Justice Scalia, in-
sisting that the latter’s reliance upon the Framers is at best in-
conclusive as there is no compelling evidence of a consensus 
among them regarding the role of religion in public life.  Justice 
Souter further lambasted his colleague’s view that the deity of 
the Framers “was the God of monotheism”282 and pointed out, a 
la Justice Story, that the purpose of the Establishment Clause 
was simply “‘to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects.’”283  
The original meaning of the clause, in other words, did not give a 
privileged place to monotheistic conceptions of deity “with Mosaic 
antecedents.”284 
3.  Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence   
Justice O’Connor joined the majority’s opinion.  She main-
 
 273 Id. at 2730. 
 274 Id. at 2729. 
 275 Id. at 2730. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 2733 (majority opinion). 
 278 Id. at 2742. 
 279 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 280 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2736. 
 281 Id. at 2735. 
 282 Id. at 2744. 
 283 Id. at 2745 (quoting Justice Story, in R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 13 (1988)) (emphasis omitted). 
 284 Id. 
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tained that the Establishment Clause prohibits government coer-
cion, preference, and endorsement in matters of religion,285 and 
opined that the counties’ display “conveys an unmistakable mes-
sage of endorsement to the reasonable observer.”286 
4.  Justice Scalia’s Dissent   
Justice Scalia was joined in his dissent by the Chief Justice, 
Justice Thomas, and Justice Kennedy in part, and proclaimed his 
desire to return to the original meaning of the Establishment 
Clause.  To that end, he pointed out that the first actions by all 
three branches of the national government287 were to foster mo-
rality and civil responsibility by encouraging religion.288  He ad-
duced supportive evidence from Presidents Washington, John 
Adams, Jefferson, and Madison289 and asked, “With all of this re-
ality (and much more) staring it in the face, how can the Court 
possibly assert that the ‘“the First Amendment mandates gov-
ernmental neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion?’”290 
The principle of religion-neutrality has, he stated, been 
abandoned by the Court on a number of occasions.291  The only 
“good reason”292 why the Court occasionally ignores it has to do 
with the desire to save face with the American people who, he in-
sisted, would not stand for an across-the-board application of 
it.293  Because Justice Scalia rejects the principle, he found no 
reason to declare that the counties’ displays of the Ten Com-
mandments violated the Establishment Clause.  According to his 
reading of the Clause, it permits the disregard of polytheists as 
well as of atheists.294 
Justice Scalia pointed out that he has adduced in support of 
his position, in contrast to that of Justice Stevens, primarily offi-
cial acts and proclamations of the United States, such as the 
First Congress’s commencement of the practice of legislative 
prayer, its appointment of congressional chaplains, its proposal 
of a Thanksgiving Proclamation, President Washington’s 
Thanksgiving Proclamation, and the invocation of God at the 
opening of sessions of the Supreme Court.295  In further reply to 
 
 285 Id. at 2746 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 286 Id. at 2747. 
 287 Id. at 2748–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 288 Id. at 2749. 
 289 Id. at 2749–50. 
 290 Id. at 2750. 
 291 Id. at 2751–52. 
 292 Id. at 2752. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. at 2753. 
 295 Id. at 2753–54. 
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his colleague, Justice Scalia maintained that, even though the 
text of the Constitution may fail to elucidate the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause, such official state actions do.296  In addi-
tion, the religious view supported by the Framers was, he opined, 
broadly monotheistic, since they proclaimed a single beneficent 
God, but never Jesus Christ.297 
Justice Scalia of course took issue with the notion of the “liv-
ing Constitution.”298  He questioned why, if the Constitution is 
supposed to change in accordance with “democratic aspira-
tions,”299 the same are always found in the Justices’ own personal 
views of the Establishment Clause rather than in the current so-
ciety’s dispositions.300 
He likewise denied that his originalist position marginalizes 
the belief systems of millions of Americans who are not of a 
monotheistic persuasion.  Far from it.  Polytheism, he insisted, is 
completely protected by the Religion Clauses, but it does not fol-
low from that fact that the state’s invocation of God is an estab-
lishment.301 
Justice Scalia believed that the net effect of McCreary is to 
heighten the requirements of Lemon, first by justifying inquiry 
into legislative purpose as a means of ascertaining how govern-
mental action would appear to an objective observer, and second 
by requiring that a secular purpose predominate over any pur-
pose to advance religion.302  In other words, no longer is the 
search for a secular purpose, but the search now consists of a rig-
orous and full-scale review of the facts with the idea that, in or-
der to pass constitutional muster, any religious purpose must be 
subordinate to the secular one.303 
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent with the observation 
that the exhibits in question were meant only to focus upon the 
historic role of religious belief in the country’s communal life.  
That role, he insisted, is permissible.304  To outlaw them on that 
basis is to fall prey to what Justice Goldberg once called an “un-
tutored devotion to the concept of neutrality”305 and would, with-
out question, “commit the Court (and the Nation) to a revisionist 
 
 296 Id. at 2754–55. 
 297 Id. at 2755. 
 298 Id. at 2756. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Id.at 2757. 
 303 Id. at 2758. 
 304 Id. at 2762–63. 
 305 Id. at 2763 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 
(1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
299-358 SMITH.DOC 5/30/2007 9:58:56 PM 
2006] Does God Belong in American Public Life? 351 
agenda of secularization.”306 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Any Sure Verdict from History? 
The opinions of the Justices concerning governmentally sup-
ported religious displays turn, in large part, upon a consideration 
of the role of religion in the earliest days of the Republic.  Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas are convinced that the Framers, includ-
ing Thomas Jefferson, who was not in attendance at the Consti-
tutional Convention, appreciated public religion and desired to 
encourage it.  Justices Souter and Stevens, on the other hand, 
entertain doubts about that proposition.  Yet they all cull 
through the pages of history, quick to highlight any evidence to 
support their respective points-of-view.  There is a veritable 
mountain of evidence on either side of the issue, but these are 
separated by a canyon, both deep and wide, representing the his-
torically unknown, and perhaps unknowable.  The crux of the 
problem is that the Constitutional Convention did not explicitly 
and substantively address the role of religion in public.  Nowhere 
within the paragraphs of the country’s founding document is 
there so much as a reference to God.  We are left, ultimately, 
looking down into an abyss of silence, from and about which we 
are free to conclude whatever we wish.  My contention is not that 
all historical investigations end in deadlock, but that the search 
for a consensual view among the Founders concerning the role of 
religion in public life is an investigation that has managed to 
disappoint more than it has satisfied hopeful expectation.  The 
search has proven to be an historical dead-end.307 
Arguing about that which is irresolvable raises a host of in-
teresting questions, not the least of which is the following: “What 
do we hope to accomplish by the exercise?”  The issues of the de-
 
 306 Id. 
 307 Steven G. Gey, in critical response to Carl H. Esbeck’s historical conclusions from 
history regarding the church-state relationship throughout the early years of the Repub-
lic, is not sanguine about the historical approach to the Religious Clauses.  Gey astutely 
points out, “When all is said and done, the historical account of church and state in the 
early republic leaves us right where we started . . . .”  See Steven G. Gey, More Or Less 
Bunk: The Establishment Clause Answers That History Doesn’t Provide, 2004 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1617, 1630 (2004).  Gey further argues, “History frames the discussion about consti-
tutional meaning and provides a context in which the various dimensions of constitutional 
questions can be viewed in sharp relief.  History provokes us to ask the right questions, 
but it will never give us all the right answers.”  Id. at 1631.  With these comments, I gen-
erally agree.  But then Gey, more than a bit mysteriously, adds, “However, an honest feal-
ty to history will yield an Establishment Clause that no religiously pluralistic modern 
democracy would want or accept.”  Id.  This statement tends to assume that an “original 
meaning” is discoverable if the historical investigator is but honest in the pursuit of it.  
Gey has, whether he knows it or not, stated two positions that are not compatible. 
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bate may certainly be brought into stark, trenchant focus, but 
that in and of itself does not issue in a resolution.  Perhaps one 
will be sufficiently impressed by particular strands of evidence 
that he or she will venture a conclusion and defend it in a two-
fisted manner in a learned monograph.  Yet others taking an an-
tipodal position will do the same.  The question is whether, given 
the state of the evidence, the kind of historical argument in 
which the Justices are engaged is not an exercise in futility. 
I contend that it is, if the hope is for an answer beyond rea-
sonable dispute.  As the Justices’ expressions of opinion about es-
tablishment matters have grown increasingly animated, the 
Court has become more deeply divided than ever.  That is be-
cause the problem posed by the presence of religion in circles of 
state is not one that will ever be resolved by historical inquiry.  
Resort to the metaphorical mantra of “a wall of separation” 
solves nothing; it only triggers the historical reflection that has 
plunged the Court into its current morass.  Historical investiga-
tion may certainly enlighten us by charting one or more plausible 
explanations, but it is farfetched to believe that such investiga-
tion will one day conclude the debate. 
B.  A Discussion of Justice Scalia’s Originalism 
Justice Scalia’s determination to uncover the original mean-
ing of the Establishment Clause purchases a variety of assump-
tions that are problematic.  The first is that “original meaning” 
lends itself to discovery through meticulous historical investiga-
tion.  This assumption is false; in fact, the “original meaning” 
that one derives from an investigation appears to have as much, 
if not more, to do with the historical investigator as it does the 
data investigated.  How are we, for example, to assess James 
Madison’s Detached Memorandum?  Is it a group of idle reflec-
tions teetering upon irrelevancy by virtue of having been written 
by the man years after he left office?  Or does the Memorandum 
provide us the profoundest kind of insight into Madison’s most 
seasoned thoughts?  In the same way, when William Williams of 
Connecticut, who suggested that the Preamble of the Constitu-
tion be modified to include reference to “the one living and true 
God, the creator and supreme Governour of the world,”308 but 
nonetheless approved the document without this or any other 
such reference, what may we conclude by his action?  Some may 
argue he came to accept the notion that the Constitution is an 
entirely secular document, while others may charge that, since 
the choice before the state ratifying conventions was either to ac-
 
 308 See William Williams to the Printer, supra note 21, at 193. 
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cept or to reject the newly proposed Constitution, he chose to do 
the former in the hope that the document would later be 
amended.  On what principled basis do we decide upon the “origi-
nal meaning”? 
Yet let us assume, arguendo, that the welter of historical 
questions that present themselves concerning the Framers’ 
thoughts, ideas, and intentions regarding the relationship be-
tween religion and the state readily lend themselves to original 
meaning analysis.  What precisely are we to do with our conclu-
sions?  Are we free, in Pickwickian fashion, to transplant them 
into our contemporary state and culture, into post-modernity if 
you will?  If so, how do we square original meanings with our 
radically expanded notion of the state, our changing demograph-
ics, and the advent of cultural problems the Framers could 
scarcely have imagined?  Even Justice Scalia is not sufficiently 
audacious to suggest that original meanings can broadjump into 
the twenty-first century. 
He has instead involved himself, perhaps unwittingly, in an 
exercise chock-full of assumptions and abstractions.  Consider 
the progression of his argument—he defends public displays of 
the Decalogue by appealing to the Framers’ monotheistic vision 
of God, and then moves to a “disregard of polytheists and believ-
ers in unconcerned deities.”309  The First Commandment states, 
“Thou shalt have no other gods before me.”  It exemplifies a 
henotheistic faith, one defined as belief in a single deity without 
denying the existence of others, rather than a monotheistic faith, 
which holds to belief in a single god.  Justice Scalia’s transition 
from the Ten Commandments to monotheism is unwarranted.  
His conclusion that “polytheists and believers in unconcerned 
deities” can be disregarded on the strength of the Establishment 
Clause does not follow, since he has not proven that the Com-
mandments, which he believes shaped the Framers’ religious 
views, are built upon a monotheistic faith. 
Even if the transition from the Commandments to the Fram-
ers’ view of God were perfectly sound, one still cannot move from 
Christian monotheism to monotheism in general without engag-
ing a formidable abstraction and being transported a consider-
able distance from the Framers’ original meaning.  Monotheism 
does not necessarily entail beneficence or grace.  One may believe 
in a single deity who instructs his or her devotees to kill and to 
plunder their neighbors as infidels.  Such a belief, I dare say, is 
light-years from the notion of deity entertained by any of the 
Framers.  So Justice Scalia’s attempt to capture original meaning 
 
 309 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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succeeds mainly in disclosing his own “judicial predilections” and 
“personal preferences,”310 an endeavor that his comrade in arms, 
Justice Thomas, roundly criticizes. 
C.  Justices Souter and Stevens on Neutrality 
It is to Justice Breyer’s credit that he frankly admits the role 
of subjective “legal judgment” in Establishment Clause cases.311  
Those with whom he voted in both Van Orden and McCreary, to 
be sure, exercised such judgment.  Justices Stevens and Souter 
did so, although they appeared to rest their judicial analysis on 
the principle of neutrality.  Justice Souter declared, “If neutrality 
in religion means something, any citizen should be able to visit 
that civic home [the capitol grounds in Texas] without having to 
confront religious expressions clearly meant to convey an official 
religious position that may be at odds with his own religion, or 
with rejection of religion.”312  Justice Stevens also insisted, “The 
principle that guides my analysis is neutrality.”313  What they 
both mean by “neutrality” is that the state is to be indifferent to 
religion, relegating it to a private sphere.  They mean that the 
Constitution is a godless document that was intended to create a 
godless state.  If one can walk the capitol grounds in Austin, 
Texas and not be confronted by religious expressions, that sug-
gests that religious expressions are banned there.  “Neutrality,” 
for these Justices, bristles with hostility to religion.  I have else-
where analyzed the various meanings of this term and concluded, 
“The net effect of utilizing the concept of neutrality in religion 
cases amounts to little more than judicial legerdemain and ob-
fuscation.”314  What more can one say about judicial action that 
 
 310 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 311 Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  Gregg Abbott, the Texas At-
torney General who defended the constitutionality of the Decalogue display in the Van 
Orden case, comments that Justice Breyer’s “‘legal judgment’ rule may prove fulcrumatic 
in the future.”  Gregg Abbott, Upholding the Unbroken Tradition: Constitutional Ac-
knowledgment of the Ten Commandments in the Public Square, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 51, 59 (2005).  Is it a “rule” or a judicial decision-making process?  It is difficult for one 
to understand how this “rule” constrains a Justice to any outcome other than the one 
which he or she desires. 
 312 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2897 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 313 Id at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 314 “Religion-Neutral” Jurisprudence, supra note 190, at 815, 870.  It is important to 
realize that “neutrality” is a term that conveys various meanings, depending upon the 
underlying political theory driving the interpretation of the Religion Clauses.  Their opin-
ions in these two Ten Commandments cases leave no doubt that Justices Souter and Ste-
vens are using the term to mean indifference toward the religious, which for them has no 
constructive role to play in the public arena.  Yet compare their opinions here with the 
majority opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), emphasizing that a 
school voucher program was religion-neutral, because it conferred educational benefits to 
a large group of people “without reference to religion.” Id. at 653.  Needless to say, Jus-
tices Souter and Stevens dissented.  The latter stated that “the voluntary character of the 
private choice to prefer a parochial education over an education in the public school sys-
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purports to be neutral toward the religious while prohibiting it in 
all state-sponsored activity and, at the same time, giving the irre-
ligious free reign? 
This rhetorical question brings me to a crucial point concern-
ing the secular ideal.  The kind of neutrality that Justices Souter 
and Stevens praise is that of traditional liberalism, which com-
mits one to a secular revisionist agenda.  Liberalism dichoto-
mizes our lives into public and private spheres.  Religious ex-
pression finds a home only in the latter.  This means that 
congressional and legislative chaplains, references to God on the 
currency or in the Pledge of Allegiance, an isolated public display 
of the Ten Commandments or of a crèche during the holiday sea-
son,  prayer and devotional Bible-reading in public schools, and 
all other references to God in the public sphere are misguided, 
out-of-place, and coercive.  But why must the Establishment 
Clause of the Constitution be so interpreted?  I have argued in 
Parts II through V of this Article that such a necessity is not real, 
but only imagined.  Neutrality, as understood by Justices Souter 
and Stevens, is shorthand for the secular ideal of traditional lib-
eralism.  That ideal is not dictated by the actual text of the Con-
stitution any more than Justice Scalia’s original meanings. 
D.  Toward a Political Jurisprudence 
If we reject traditional liberalism and its secular ideal and 
reject Justice Scalia’s method of original meaning, where does 
that leave us?  It leaves us in precisely the same place where we 
were following Part V of this Article.  We have a political choice 
to make, either in favor of the godless state or against it. 
It is not popular to regard Supreme Court Justices as pro-
pounding answers to political questions.  Yet that is what they do 
when they confront Establishment Clause cases.  Both “original 
meaning” and “neutrality” analysis are ways of expressing politi-
cal positions.  Original meaning is an expression of what I have 
elsewhere called “de facto establishmentarianism,”315 and “neu-
trality” embodies, as I have stated, the philosophy of liberal-
ism.316  While neither is found in the actual text of the Constitu-
tion, both are typologies that are implied by the Religion Clauses. 
 
tem seems to me quite irrelevant to the question whether the government’s choice to pay 
for religious indoctrination is constitutionally permissible.”  Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).   Justice Souter, in a similar way, viewed the Ohio voucher program to be in con-
flict with Everson.  Id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting).  The meaning of neutrality depends 
upon the political theory that is in place. 
 315 L. Scott Smith, Constitutional Meanings of “Religion” Past and Present: Explora-
tions in Definition and Theory, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 89, 117 tbl (2004). 
 316 Id. 
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The Supreme Court, instead of engaging in what is at best a 
sophistic debate, where genuine political perspectives are camou-
flaged and obscured by glib discussions of “neutrality” and “origi-
nal meaning,” could do much better to admit that the resolution 
of Establishment Clause cases is not to be found in historical in-
vestigation, philosophical analysis, or the examination of legal 
precedents, although all three may contribute to decisions.  The 
essential, but missing, ingredient from the Court’s discussions is 
a frank acknowledgment of the importance of political typology. 
“Political typology” does not suggest that there be an open, 
free-for-all discussion of politics in judicial decisions, but of only 
those political positions that result from combining the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment.  What I mean by “combining 
the Religion Clauses” may be briefly explicated as follows: the 
Establishment Clause may be understood in terms of “accommo-
dationism” or “separationism,” and the Free Exercise Clause in 
terms of “narrow” or “expansive” free exercise.  The various com-
binations of these possibilities give rise to four political points-of-
view: (1) separationism and narrow free exercise—classical liber-
alism; (2) separationism and expansive free exercise—
communitarianism; (3) accommodationism and expansive free 
exercise—revised liberalism; and (4) accommodationism and nar-
row free exercise—de facto establishmentarianism. 
These political typologies can contribute to an overarching 
synthesis, which allows one to recast the jurisprudence of relig-
ion in a straightforward and hardheadedly political fashion.  
Elsewhere I have attempted to do this.317  The primary advan-
tage of such an effort is that, while it acknowledges that the Re-
ligion Clauses lend themselves to various forms of political 
analysis, it presses forward toward a comprehensive, synthetic 
approach of adjudication, without allowing any one typological 
position to be overwhelmed by the others.  What is more, because 
the approach I am defending is balanced, it might well present 
itself as a helpful compromise for breaking the ideological and po-
litical logjam that presently divides the Court and that renders 
its jurisprudence of religion a “muddle.”318 
 
 317 From Typology to Synthesis, supra note 81. 
 318 Michael W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Where Is the 
Supreme Court Heading?, in FIRST AMENDMENT LAW HANDBOOK 269 (James L. Swanson 
& Christian L. Castle eds., 1990).  One may ask about Van Orden and McCreary, “Where 
do these split decisions leave those desiring to post the Decalogue, or wondering if exist-
ing postings pass Constitutional muster?”  See Sue Ann Mota, Competing Judicial Phi-
losophies and Differing Outcomes: The U.S. Supreme Court Allows and Disallows the 
Posting of the Ten Commandments on Public Property in Van Orden v. Perry and 
McCreary County v. ACLU, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 99 (2006), in which the author at-
tempts to give the reader guidelines by which to chart constitutionality.  Id. at 120.  Such 
an effort is largely misspent.  The fact is that there is a political tug-of-war occurring on 
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CONCLUSION 
“Does God belong in American public life?” is the question 
with which we began.  The answer is nowhere explicitly set forth 
in the Constitution, nor is it unambiguously suggested by a study 
of the Framers’ ideas and actions.  Any answer to the question 
derived from in-depth historical inquiry will, at best, receive only 
support from, not be necessitated by, that inquiry.  Kramnick 
and Moore, as I have argued, will convince no one of the truth of 
their thesis who is not already convinced.  After examining the 
historical evidence pertaining to whether the Constitution was 
intended to create a godless state, a fair-minded investigator, not 
given to tendentious examination of the sources, will admit that 
he or she is unsure. 
The historical uncertainty that looms over this question 
compels one to ask another: Why, then, has the Establishment 
Clause, since Everson, been interpreted as if the Constitution 
were intended to give birth to a secular state?  I have argued that 
this has little to do with the Constitution and most everything to 
do with the secular revolution that roared like a tsunami over 
Europe and began flooding into this country during the last half 
of the nineteenth century.  By the end of that century, higher 
education, the pursuit of the natural sciences, and the study of 
law had begun functioning in a secular mode.  By the middle of 
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had interpreted the 
Establishment Clause as erecting a “wall” by which to protect the 
state from the slightest vestiges of religion.  The Court, by means 
of the incorporation doctrine and a disregard for the balances of 
federalism, had essentially proclaimed itself the unconditional 
guardian of liberty, who meticulously polices the “high and im-
pregnable wall” separating American public life from religious 
words and actions.  I have suggested, categorically and unabash-
edly, that the Court’s secularization agenda was an attempt to 
enhance its own power as well as to walk in step with the intelli-
gentsia’s secular revolution. 
One’s answer to the question posed by this Article, I have 
also maintained, comes down in the final analysis to a political 
determination.  Either one accepts the idea of a secular state or 
one rejects it.  There is no place to look outside politics for a de-
finitive answer. 
 
the Court, and Establishment decisions hang frequently by a mere thread.  What is at 
stake is whether the secular ideal of traditional liberalism, as set forth in Everson, will 
continue to survive.  There is little for the practitioner to do than to present the most 
compelling arguments he or she can on one side or the other, with the realization that the 
debate is essentially about politics, not interpreting the fine points of legal precedent. 
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The Supreme Court’s recent adjudication of two cases involv-
ing the public display of the Ten Commandments demonstrates 
the inconclusiveness of any historical argument, since the same 
Justices in both cases adduced evidence to affirm one display and 
to outlaw the other.  The thoroughly transparent arguments in 
behalf of “original meaning” and “neutrality” serve only to high-
light the underlying political nature of the question before the 
Justices and their political treatment of it. 
Finally, I have recommended that the Court break its block-
age of discourse and self-consciously adopt a political theory of 
religion-jurisprudence, one that holds together the strongest 
points of the political typologies that emerge from a consideration 
of the Religion Clauses.  Since the Court is involved in political 
policymaking anyway, such a theory would not be an extreme 
departure from its routine practice.  Yet the theory would de-
mand that the Court honestly acknowledge the political nature of 
the subject matter.  The balance in the theory would also com-
prise a kind of compromise, since using the theory means holding 
all political perspectives in a synthetic unity without allowing 
one perspective to be overwhelmed by the rest.  The notion of de-
ity, conceived in a broad, but not explicitly Christian manner (de 
facto establishmentarianism), can and should belong to American 
public life, along with a respect for the values of individual 
autonomy (classical liberalism), freedom of association (commu-




 319 See From Typology to Synthesis, supra note 81. 
